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ABSTRACT 
  China has been home to some of the most prominent hackers and hacker 
groups of the global community throughout the last decade. In the last ten years, 
countless attacks globally have been linked to the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) or those operating within the PRC. This exploration attempts to investigate 
the story, ideology, institutions, actions, and motivations of the Chinese hackers 
collectively, as sub-groups, and as individuals.  I will do this using sources 
ranging from basic news coverage, interviews with experts and industry veterans, 
secondary reportage, leaked documents from government and private sources, 
government white papers, legal codes, blogs and microblogs, a wide array of 
materials from the darker corners of the online world, and many other materials. 
The work will begin to sketch for the reader some of the general and specific 
aspects of the shadowy world of cybercrime and hacker culture in China in recent 
years. One of the most prevalent beliefs is that the Chinese government is in fact 
the one responsible, whether directly or by sponsor, for cyber-attacks on foreign 
systems. My careful analysis has revealed is not always the case, or at least 
more complex than simply labeling the group as a state actor. At the root of these 
attacks is a social movement of "hacktivists," a patriotic sub-culture of Chinese 
hackers. It is incorrect to allege that all attacks are performed by state-sponsored 
individuals or groups, because there are many individuals and groups that are 
motivated by other factors. 
 
 
iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT  ................................................................................................. iii 
LIST OF TABLES  ........................................................................................ vi 
LIST OF FIGURES  ...................................................................................... vii 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1 
Statement of Purpose  ....................................................................... 2 
Methodologies  .................................................................................. 14 
Goal of Research  .............................................................................. 17 
Limitations of the Study ..................................................................... 18 
CHAPTER ONE: SHAPING THE FOUNDATIONS  ..................................... 28 
 The Fight for Democracy  .................................................................. 31 
 China and the Internet  ...................................................................... 34 
 Golden Shield Project (The Great Firewall of China)  ........................ 38 
 Netizen Movement  ............................................................................ 41 
 Nationalism  ....................................................................................... 46 
CHAPTER TWO: WHAT DEFINES HACKER CULTURE? ..........................  54 
 Responses to Cyber-attacks  ............................................................. 60 
 Who Are These Hackers?  ................................................................. 65 
CHAPTER THREE: THE EVOLUTION OF CHINESE HACKERS …………   72 
1998- The Birth of Chinese Hacking .................................................. 74 
Tools of the Trade .............................................................................. 78 
Hacker War: US-China ...................................................................... 82 
CHAPTER FOUR: INDEPENDENT ACTORS………………………………..    86 
 Honker Union (1999/2001-Present) ................................................... 87 
 Red Hacker Alliance (1998-Present) ................................................. 93 
 China Eagle and Wan Tao (2000-Dissolved) ..................................... 94 
v 
 
 Javaphile and Coolswallow (2000-2008) ........................................... 96 
 Network Crack Program Hacker (NCPH) and Wicked Rose .............. 98 
CHAPTER FIVE: STATE-SPONSORED GROUPS  .................................... 102 
 The Science of Military Strategy and the Role of the Party  ............... 104 
 PLA Unit 61398: Advanced Persistent Threat 1  ................................ 108 
 Operation Shady Rat (2006-2010)  .................................................... 113 
 Operation Aurora (2009-2010)  .......................................................... 115 
 Deep Panda (2011-2015)  ................................................................. 117 
 Operation Poisoned Hurricane (2014)  .............................................. 119 
 Emissary Panda (2015-Present)  ....................................................... 120 
 Wekby (2015)  ................................................................................... 122 
CHAPTER SIX: FREELANCE ACTORS, THE GREY AREA ....................... 124 
 Yujun Yumin  ..................................................................................... 127 
 GhostNet (2006-2009)  ...................................................................... 129 
 Hidden Lynx (2009-2012?)  ............................................................... 130 
 Black Vine (2012-2014)  .................................................................... 131 
CHAPTER SEVEN: CYBER-CRIME AND THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY .....132 
 A Borderless Crime  ........................................................................... 133 
 Creation of International Laws  .......................................................... 134 
REFERENCES  ............................................................................................ 141 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Common Types of Hacking Attacks… ...............................................    59 
Table 2. Chronological Timeline of Significant Hacker Attacks from China ..    81 
Table 3. Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China………...103 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Anonymous Video Screenshot and Logo ...................................... 26 
Figure 2. Operation Payback Message ........................................................ 27 
Figure 3. HRW.org Censorship ..................................................................... 41 
Figure 4. Nationalism: An International Comparison .................................... 48 
Figure 5. Advanced Persistent Threat Lifestyle ............................................ 58 
Figure 6. Types of Cyber Crime Attacks in 2015 .......................................... 61 
Figure 7. Types of Attacks in December 2013 .............................................. 62 
Figure 8. Targeted Systems and Motivations in 2013 ................................... 64 
Figure 9. November 2013 Attacks ................................................................ 65 
Figure 10. Honker Union Attacks on Iranian Sites ........................................ 90 
Figure 11. Message From Javaphile After Taiwan Attack ............................ 97 
Figure 12. Wicked Rose, Leader of NCPH ................................................... 100 
Figure 13. The Hacker Studio ....................................................................... 101 
Figure 14. Unit 61398 Activity ....................................................................... 109 
Figure 15. Cyber-Attacks Performed by APT1.............................................. 110 
Figure 16. Shady Rat Phishing Attack .......................................................... 115 
Figure 17. FBI Alert for Deep Panda ............................................................ 118 
Figure 18. Logo and Calling Card for Deep Panda ....................................... 119 
Figure 19. Emissary Panda Attacks 2015 ..................................................... 121 
Figure 20. Wekby Phishing Attack ................................................................ 123
 
 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 There is an innovative frontier of cyber warfare that is rapidly expanding 
all over the world, with billions of individuals now united by the internet. Due to 
the greater opportunities to acquire information, individuals are linked in a way 
that has never been experienced before. Massive security concerns within online 
systems are increasing and transforming on a daily basis due to the global 
access to monetary and government systems, as well as information stored by 
private institutions. These security issues parallel the creation and growth of a 
global hacker culture. China has been home to some of the most prominent 
hackers and hacker groups of the global community throughout the last decade. 
In the last ten years, countless attacks globally have been linked to the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) or those operating within the PRC. According to the 
2012 State of the Internet Report published by the Akamai group, an online 
services provider, a third of all cyber-attacks that they were aware of have 
originated in China in the third quarter of 2012.1 This report names China as the 
biggest hacking entity and as the statistical home to the majority of cyber-attacks 
among all countries. 
  In the last twenty years China has been in the midst of a type of internet 
revolution as its peoples are seeking new ways to express themselves as they 
are further exposed to the greater technology-based globe. Thanks to the 
establishment of the internet and the liberties that are allowed to its users, the 
hacking culture in China has grown and advanced in ways that are more dynamic 
                                                          
1 Akamai. Q1 State If the Internet Report 2013. Rep. N.p.: Akamai, 2013. Print. 
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and dramatic than any other nation. Although cyber-crimes in Russia, the United 
States, and countries of the Middle East have garnered much attention over the 
past few decades, Chinese hackers operate on a scale far greater and vastly 
different than any other.  
 
Statement of Purpose 
This exploration attempts to investigate the story, ideology, institutions, 
actions, and motivations of the Chinese hackers collectively, as sub-groups, and 
as individuals.  I will do this using sources ranging from basic news coverage, 
interviews with experts and industry veterans, secondary reportage, leaked 
documents from government and private sources, government white papers, 
legal codes, blogs and microblogs, a wide array of materials from the darker 
corners of the online world, and many other materials. I hope that the work will 
begin to sketch for the reader some of the general and specific aspects of the 
shadowy world of cybercrime and hacker culture in China in recent years. 
   In academic studies and the media, there is a developing fascination in 
cyber-attacks and cyber-espionage. This includes a particular interest in Chinese 
hackers infiltrating personal, corporate, and government webpages in a wide 
variety of countries. One of the most prevalent beliefs is that the Chinese 
government is in fact the one responsible, whether directly or by sponsor, for 
cyber-attacks on foreign systems. My careful analysis has revealed is not always 
the case, or at least more complex than simply labeling the group as a state 
actor. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has indeed established one of the 
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most advanced cyber-capabilities apart from Russia, Iran, and the United States. 
In some accusations, it is suspected that Chinese authorities are simply 
intentionally ignoring unlawful behaviors that further the country’s economic 
goals, or which strengthen the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) agenda. 
  Yet, there is something truly extraordinary taking place in China that many 
media outlets tend to gloss over. Hidden at the root of these attacks is a social 
movement of "hacktivists," a patriotic sub-culture of Chinese hackers. It is too 
simple and incorrect to allege that all attacks are performed by state-sponsored 
individuals or groups, because there are many individuals and groups that are 
motivated by other factors. There are individuals who perform these actions 
outside of the influence of the government, and there are many distinct 
motivations involved. This complexity is generally not found in much news 
coverage and analysis related to the field of global cyber warfare, but this 
landscape is indeed complex and worth further exploration. In my research, I 
have found that there are underlying factors related to Chinese cultural identity, 
nationalism, individual status, and a hacker’s personal reputation that can be 
hidden within the context of this cyber-war. 
Recently, there has been a push within China to restore some traditional 
forms of identity. Today, both Confucianism and Maoism are being revived in 
China. Whether it is a return to Confucian beliefs, or merely reverting the 
Communist Party back towards Maoist beliefs, there is indeed cultural change 
happening. The cultural landscape of China continues to radically transform and 
shift, even as it did throughout most of the twentieth century. The post-Mao era 
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has brought not slowing to the cultural changes and the constant reinvention of 
Chinese identity, and these changes certainly affect China’s hacker culture. 
Within the cyber-attacks that originate in China sometimes there are patriotic 
motivations even if the group is not employed or directed by the state. There is 
an attempt to preserve an essential or idealized Chinese identity in the midst of a 
barrage of foreign ideas and products.  Sometimes this is Confucian China that is 
considered to be under attack by patriotic Chinese people, sometimes it is 
Marxism and Maoism, and sometimes it is China’s sovereign claims to its 
borders at sea and on land. Interestingly, within these attacks by hackers there 
can be seen a kind of homegrown effort to enhance or protect Chinese identity 
and interest. This is a new generation, and it is one that is perhaps less troubled 
than those before it by painful past events like the Cultural Revolution or 
Tiananmen Square. These events profoundly alienated and embittered activists 
and intellectuals, many of whom were silenced, or reluctantly chose silence, or 
emigrated at their first opportunity. While this new generation of potential activists 
has grown with perhaps some awareness of these events, online forums and 
new media have given new intellectuals and activists ways to organize and 
express themselves that individuals in these earlier eras could not. These 
platforms, while the state tries to control them in certain ways, still can potentially 
give voice to patriotism, protest, and frustration of all kinds as articulations of 
cultural identity, and that cultural continues to be in flux. 
  The topic of cybercrime and cyberwarfare are extraordinarily important 
elements in the constantly innovating technical landscape where cyberspace 
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converges with an individual’s more essential daily facets. The occurrence of 
hacking is a result of the advancement in online networking tools like the Internet. 
Cyber-espionage has the potential to affect everything from entertainment to 
financial transactions, social networking, education, and countless other aspects 
of our lives. In fact, many online systems that comprise of today’s global 
community, including health-care organizations, fiscal systems, and confidential 
military systems can be potentially destroyed or looted by hackers. From high-
profile and far-reaching banking hacks, to the titanic leaks and hacks connected 
to Edward Snowden and Julian Assange, and the organizations Ashley Madison 
and Mossack Fonseca, the world is becoming increasingly aware that the risk to 
our confidential information seems to be growing. It impacts people, and it harms 
international organizations. Besides the most prominent global hacks noted 
immediately above, Chinese hackers continue to work at an astounding scale. 
One Chinese group alone, APT1, has methodically stolen hundreds of terabytes 
of information from at least one hundred and forty one organizations, and has 
proven that it has the competence and the intention to pilfer from dozens of 
organizations at the same time.2 Hacking activities have led to the loss of billions 
of dollars worldwide, whether directly and incidentally.  
  Due to this, the subject of cyber-crime is a hotly deliberated topic by both 
media and security groups. According to Dmitri Alperovitch, vice president of 
threat research for the cybersecurity specialists, McAfee Securities, “Today we 
see pretty much any company that has valuable intellectual property or trade 
                                                          
2 Mandiant Inc. APT1: Exposing One of China's Espionage Units. Mandiant, 2014. Print. 
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secrets of any kind being pilfered continually, all day long, every day, 
relentlessly.”3 It is the pilfering of items like trade secrets and patents that has 
cost American companies substantial income and has regularly led to the loss of 
employment opportunities. In an interview that I performed with the Vice 
President of Cyber Security at Masergy, David Venable, “Chinese cyber efforts 
have typically been around stealing intellectual property for business.  This could 
be both government backed, or financed independently.  But again, sometimes 
the same individuals will do work for both, so there can be overlap.”4 Estimates of 
job losses due to cybercrime could be as high as 200,000 American jobs, and as 
many as 150,000 jobs in Europe.5 The Chief of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, James Comey, has gone on record stating that the yearly costs to 
American businesses are “impossible to count,” however, extend well into the 
billions.6 These losses are a result of lost exclusive markets, lost 
competitiveness, and other factors as industry secrets are stolen and used by 
competitors. 
  From Washington’s perspective, Cybersecurity and espionage like this 
constitutes a topic that the People’s Republic of China has commonly avoided or 
denied. Yet potentially, it has the ability to drastically influence impending 
political, economic, and military dealings between the U.S. and China. The 
                                                          
3 Gross, Michael Joseph. "Enter the Cyber-dragon." Vanity Fair. Sept, 2011. Accessed October 
19, 2015. http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2011/09/chinese-hacking-201109 
4 Venable, David. “Chinese Hackers.” E-mail interview by author. April 13, 2016. 
5 MCAffee Securities. Net Losses: Estimating the Global Cost of Cybercrime. Report. Santa 
Clara: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014. Losses: Estimating  
6 "FBI Chief: China Leader in Cyber Crime." Voice of America News. October 5, 2014. Accessed 
October 19, 2015. http://www.voanews.com/content/fbi-chief-says-china-leader-in-cyber-
crime/2473611.html 
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debate surrounding theft of intellectual property will become vastly more 
significant as modern societies becomes progressively more technological, and a 
desire to understand and curb hacking even while hacker groups often defy law 
enforcement and even identification. 
 Within the Chinese hacking world there is an ever-changing mix of official, 
military, and civilian groups. These groups are generally tough to differentiate 
from each other. Due to this, accusations critical of the Chinese government are 
common. Security organizations like Mandiant, FireEye, and Trend Micro (all of 
which are used in this research), in addition to companies like Google have 
regularly blamed Chinese hackers in the theft of intellectual property from all 
aspects of society. This research attempt to show that this hacker culture that 
should be better understood and might be of greatest importance among all of 
China’s hacking groups moving forward, due to the range of motivations and 
targets. 
  The issue that is the focal point of my research is unravelling the nature, 
motivations, and classifications of Chinese hacker groups. The goal is to provide 
the reader with an understanding of how cultural changes in Chinese identity 
have allowed individuals the opportunity to explore and expand the landscape of 
online activism, one dimension of which is hacking. Understanding the cultural 
foundations of China’s hackers today has led me to explore the recent history of 
the People’s Republic of China, and how Chinese identity has transformed so 
fundamentally in the twentieth century, through the post-Mao era, and into the 
twentieth century. I will attempt to provide a more detailed look into Chinese 
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hacker culture, because I feel like the greater story is the hackers themselves 
instead of the Chinese government. Cyber-attacks by individuals out of China, 
whether by state-sponsored actors, by independent nationalistic groups, or by 
profit-seekers who are merely seeking the highest bidder for their services, has 
turned global cyber-warfare into a severe international threat. Yet in my opinion, 
the characteristically swift description of these collections by other governments, 
organizations, and various news outlets is irresponsible and perhaps dangerous. 
It is true that hackers in China are persistent, and their influence is undeniable. 
Within the society there are hacker publications, hacker organizations, and online 
hacker forums. Yet, Chinese hacker culture thrives on an internet driven 
nationalism. Even the ”Red Hacker Alliance,” which is the most commonly known 
and one of the oldest hacker groups in China, is just a loose association allowing 
disparate cells who banded together for nationalistic and political purposes. 
  The purpose of my research is to distinguish, as clearly as possible, 
between the various groups of Chinese hackers: state-sponsored, freelance, and 
independent. There are inherent motivations that distinguish the groups. There is 
also sometimes a very fine line that separates the government actors from the 
patriotic actors, and sometimes that line can be blurred beyond discernibility for 
the observer. In the course of my research, there are a few questions that I will 
attempt to answer. Why are each of these groups doing engaged in these 
activities? What are some of the common motivations for each, and how do they 
differ from one another? How do independent hackers distinguish themselves 
from their state-sponsored counterparts? How do independent hackers organize? 
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  I hope to demonstrate that it is the disparate motivations to engage in 
hacking and cyber espionage that most clearly distinguishes each group from 
one another. The motivations behind independent hackers are very intriguing. 
Some of the earliest and oldest groups are pro-China activists, but not 
necessarily or not always pro-government activists. They merely have sought the 
betterment of China through their activities. Some of the groups within this 
category came about in response to various political issues in an attempt to push 
a patriotic agenda. There are others who are fueled by financial gain, or merely 
to enhance their reputation. There are many historical, political, and social 
aspects that have not been fully explored in previous analyses, and I take on 
these daunting and opaque questions directly, using a combination of published 
and unpublished sources, interviews, and personal online investigation.  
  Along these same lines, there are other issues worth exploring such as 
the question of how these motivations affect the actions of these groups. State-
sponsored hackers have been known to attack different systems and have a 
different type of victim than that of their patriotic, non-state-sponsored 
counterparts. These different things have helped independent activists 
distinguish themselves from the others, both in the nature of their work as well as 
in how each group organizes. According to an interview I performed with a former 
member of Anonymous Serbia, the motives, methods, and goals are what make 
it possible to distinguish between independent and state-sponsored. He stated “I 
believe that main method of distinguishing them is by the work they do. 
Independent groups usually don't achieve a lot, as they are driven by emotion, 
10 
 
while state-sponsored hackers have a specific goal. So, usually I can distinguish 
them just by looking at the results of their work.”7 I will explore these questions in 
an attempt to expose the common misconceptions of cyberwarfare in China. 
  A central issue surrounding a hacker organization when attacks are 
discovered, is what type of association, if there is one at all, the group might have 
with any state administration or organization. Is it legitimately sponsored by the 
government or is it employed as a proxy to implement the Chinese Communist 
Party’s political agenda? The real question is whether there are two factions 
operating within China, with the first being a collection of private citizens and the 
other a division of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) or individuals employed as 
state agents? “Chinese hackers” have littered the media landscape, along with 
theories about government involvement, along with the growing forms of cyber-
crimes they have perpetrated. According to an interview I performed with the 
founder of HackRead, this misconception is what he believes is a significant 
issues. He states “The Chinese are very sophisticated in their attacks but 
accusing everything on them or the Russians sounds like a script of some 
“Hollywood movie.””8 What is commonly omitted from most of this reportage and 
scholarship is a clear background and explanation on just who comprises these 
secretive organizations.  
 Despite the fact that research on Chinese hackers is relatively new owing 
to the modern progress of individual and societal cyber-capabilities. There is 
some significant work emerging, and the issues concerning cybercrime on a 
                                                          
7 Uzunovic, Agan. “Chinese Hackers.” E-mail interview by author. April 5, 2016 
8 Waqas, Amir. "Chinese Hackers." E-mail interview by author. April 7, 2016.  
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grander level have been explored from quite a few perspectives. The topic of 
hacking and cyber-warfare is far older than that of hackers in China. For 
example, the United Nations General Assembly implemented computer crime law 
in 1990, which is a full four years before the internet was available in China. In 
the mid-1990’s, nations began to form tactics and shared doctrines to fight 
cybercrime and safeguard intellectual data, and in this study I will explore these 
and other policies and laws in various countries. At the beginning of the twenty-
first century, numerous regulations and laws were established internationally by 
the majority of countries throughout the international community. Countless 
countries have created legislation with protection from, and prosecution of, 
cybercrimes as the goal. Many researchers and academics had become 
attracted to the fields of cybercrime, the internet, and cyberespionage as 
information has become more easily accessible and the topics currency and 
popularity has exploded in the public sphere. 
  There are many researchers who explore topics that are peripherally 
related to my proposed field of research, and some who take on a similar topic 
directly. The Dark Sides of the Internet: On Cyber Threats and Information 
Warfare (Peter Lang GmbH, 2013), written by the individual in charge of cyber-
defense research as well as the Deputy Research Director at the Swedish 
Defense Research Agency, Roland Heickero, explores several areas related to 
my field such as theft of data and information, cybercrime and cyber threats, and 
the consequences of such actions. He explains the importance of the internet as 
a means for greater freedoms for both criminal organizations and political 
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activists alike. Another work by Julie Mehan, Associate Professor at the 
University of Maryland, titled CyberWar, CyberTerror, CyberCrime: A Guide to 
the Role of Standards in an Environment of Change and Danger, (IT Governance 
Publishing, 2008) attempts to create a greater awareness of changing threats in 
the cyber landscape. These are just two of the many examples of broad scale 
perspectives on the field of cybercrime that serve as a technical background to 
my study of Chinese hackers. There are many other individuals like Heickero and 
Mehan who provide this type of broad exploration of the topic of cybercrime. 
  The topic of Chinese cybercrime itself is less clearly defined or even 
examined in academic circles. I have found that research on the subject of cyber-
capabilities in China are usually categorized in two ways: works on global 
cyberwarfare that include sections on China, and works on the cyber-capabilities 
of the Chinese military like Elisabette M. Marvel’s China’s Cyber Warfare 
Capability. (Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010) Works such as these 
provide valuable examinations of how China fits into the larger topic of global 
cybersecurity, but they do not provide a look at the distinctive characteristics of 
Chinese hacker groups themselves. 
  Other sources explore the phenomenon and rise of hackers in other 
broader contexts. RAND Corporation researchers Martin Libicki, David Sentry 
and Julia Pollack’s book H4acker5 Wanted: An Examination of the Cybersecurity 
Labor Market (Rand Corporation, 2014) examines the confrontation between 
hackers and their targets from the perspective of a cybersecurity professional 
with examinations into the economic and political factors, as well as the demand 
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for cybersecurity labor. Hacker Culture by Douglas Thomas, Associate Professor 
at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Southern 
California, (University of Minnesota Press, 2002), provides a look at the rise of 
global hacker culture in the 1980s and 1990s. Like most sources on hackers, 
these sources do not examine China and have become somewhat outdated at 
the time of writing in spring 2016.  
  In my quest to find sources of research that is unique from the rest of the 
field, I also incorporate non-fiction sources as well. In 2015, P.W. Singer and 
August Cole published the novel Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War, 
which discusses the future of the very topic that my research incorporates: 
Chinese cyberwarfare. This type of source adds more diversity, and even though 
it is a work of fiction it is surrounded with well-informed and accurate information. 
The two authors worked very hard to provide a strong and accurate portrayal of 
how the next World War would play out between the United States and China, 
and the narrative is surrounded by actual developments and technology. Some of 
the projections of the authors have already come true, which shows the true 
strength of the research behind the novel. 
Probably the most relevant source to this study comes from Scott 
Henderson, and author who spent over twenty years as a mandarin linguist for 
various intelligence organizations, titled The Dark Visitor: Inside the World of 
Chinese Hackers.(self-published, 2007). Henderson’s work is one of the more 
significant sources that is devoted entirely to Chinese hackers and Chinese 
cybercrime. Other sources examine Chinese hackers as a whole, and the 
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damage that they are doing with each attack. It is perhaps telling that this work is 
self-published and has seems to have enjoyed a relatively small readership in 
spite of this subject being so crucial to geopolitics. The individuals and groups 
Henderson explores are motivated primarily by patriotism and nationalism, which 
looks at the motivations and differences within the Chinese hacker community. 
There are several things that set my proposed research apart from Henderson. 
His work is outdated, and my analysis can incorporate close to a decade of 
further evaluation. He also only deals with independent patriotic hackers, and not 
state-sponsored groups. 
 
Methodologies 
Beginning this project I realized that it was a daunting task to distinguish 
thousands of Chinese hackers whose motive might include those of the vigilante, 
the hobbyist, the state actor, the professional for hire, or a blending of these 
groups. While some hackers may move from one group to another within their 
career, or even may span more than one simple category in a single days 
activity, I have aimed to distinguish the categories, at least, in a way that 
separates their motivations, styles, and gives a background to why they exist in 
the forms that they do. This study uses a qualitative approach in an attempt to 
gain an understanding of underlying reasons, motivations, and insights to access 
the intricacies of Chinese cyber-attacks and the individuals or groups that carry 
them out. 
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Due to the controversial and contentious nature of the subject, I have 
attempted to provide the research with as neutral a stance as possible in an 
attempt to provide a valuable window onto these groups that goes deeper than 
hasty news coverage or biased and incomplete government statements. Both 
news reports and official statements factor in this study, but I have also 
incorporated interviews with experts and former hackers, as well as the various 
new media outlets like blogs and microblogs that are usually the most current 
and cogent analysis of the latest developments in the Chinese political and social 
landscape. Sites like China Digital Times and The China Media Project, for 
example, include both traditional news reporting, and more urgent and current 
formats like blogs by leading experts and news aggregation from many varied 
outlets in China and around the world. 
These various forms of research were chosen in order to provide 
personal, group, national, and global perspectives on cyber-attacks emanating 
from China. Information was also chosen with special attention paid to the validity 
of the source. Government response and publications, as well as statistical-
driven reports by cyber-security organizations are shown to be extremely valid 
and important to the research. Personal accounts are used to strengthen these 
other forms of research. 
  Due to the qualitative approach of the research, I attempted to establish 
as much focused information collection as possible. The methods of data 
collection come in the form of existing surveys, questionnaires, government 
publications, interviews, and secondary research. These existing forms of 
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information are taken from cyber-security experts and professional organizations 
with strong insights into global cyber-attacks. Government publications are taken 
from existing US, Chinese, and UN documents with careful analysis and 
consideration, in an attempt to provide an overall neutral perspective of the 
discourse on this subject. 
Examples of surveys in sampling include the Center for Social 
Development Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ “Surveying Internet Usage 
and its Impact in Seven Chinese Cities.” An example of an existing interview 
includes China Educational Television’s interview of Sharp Winner, HackRead’s 
interview of 7zi, and Time Magazine’s interview of Wan Tao. All of these 
individuals and sources will be thoroughly explained below. This study explores 
the nascent world of existing cyber-crime legislation both at a national level as 
well as an international level in an attempt to hypothesize the scope, awareness, 
and possible futures of cyber-attacks and cyber-warfare. Government 
publications used in this sampling include the UN’s Convention on Cybercrime, 
or the European Commission’s Report from the Commission: First Report on the 
Implementation of the Data Protection Directive, and more importantly the PLA’s 
The Science of Military Strategy. 
   Also included are new interviews with cyber-security experts and 
individuals within the hacking world. I conducted these new interviews mainly 
through digital communications as opposed to phone, which allowed the 
interview . This new information provides new insights, never before published, 
on the topics of hacking, cyber-attacks, and the Chinese hacking community. 
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Individuals were specially chosen based on their previous work and research, 
which established their authority on the subject. Their work and research are 
specific to Chinese cyber-attacks, Chinese hackers, or a related field. The 
interview subjects include a Bosnian journalist who spent significant time working 
with the hacking group Anonymous Serbia, the founder of HackRead who himself 
is an expert in the field, and the Vice President of Cyber Security with the 
organization Masergy. I questioned them on topics pertaining directly to their 
field, whether that be cyber-attacks, the role of government in perpetrating these 
attacks, or the types of tools used in common attacks. 
   This research constitutes both original research into primary resources, 
government documents, blogs, news reports and others, as well as being an 
aggregation of many deeply biased primary and secondary sources, taking them 
each at face value and evaluating their veracity and value. Many previous 
analyses of Chinese cyber-crime have been agenda-driven works that aim to 
assign guilt, often in a hasty way, most notably linking all Chinese cybercrime to 
the Chinese state.  
 
Goal of Research 
The goal of the research was to provide a deeper and more even-handed 
representation of the Chinese hacking world in recent years, to understand the 
historical roots and antecedents of the movement, and to cut through the 
propaganda and disingenuous characterizations from nearly all of the loudest 
voices in this world. The broadest conclusion of this research has been to 
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delineate various groups in the Chinese hacking world into the categories of 
independent, state-sponsored, and freelance. The findings of this study indicate 
that there are distinct differences between the three categories of Chinese 
hackers, and that these groups have fundamentally differing motivations and 
goals. I have found that it is possible to distinguish independent actors and state-
sponsored groups through the evaluation of targets of attack, types of attack, and 
means of attack. This study has found that cyber-crime motivations, perpetration, 
and tools are predictive based on group motivations and trends. The research 
and information is analyzed from several perspectives (US, China, and each of 
the three categories of hacker) in order to keep the unbiased nature of the 
findings intact, but also to provide a top-down and bottom-up perspective of the 
field. 
 
Limitations of the Study 
  There are several limitations and challenges that had to be addressed and 
overcome throughout the course of research accumulation, analysis, and writing. 
The most significant was the language barrier between English and Chinese. In 
order to overcome this, a variety of tools were used. Several native Chinese 
speakers assisted in the project as translators and sometimes simple digital 
translating tools were used to obtain a rough translations that was later refined 
with the help of native speakers. Also, news outlets like China Digital Times, 
China Media Project, The People’s Daily, Xinhua, and others consistently reprint 
English translations of prominent Chinese news items. Another issue was that of 
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western- or US-bias in source material and the author’s background, which was 
overcome through the use of statistic-driven research and careful analysis and 
parsing of sources. The last issue included that of the secluded and anonymous 
aspects of Chinese hacking culture, which made individual contact very difficult. 
Pre-existing and published interviews, as well as a more global search for 
interviews performed on my behalf, were employed. This provided both a 
Chinese and a global outlook on the topic. 
  My proposed field of study also includes Chinese social movements, as 
hacker groups are naturally founded and fueled by surrounding social and 
political changes. This field is significantly larger. A few social movements and 
cultural trends that are particularly relevant to Chinese hackers are the Chinese 
democracy and activist movements throughout the 1990s, the recent netizen 
movement (based on freedom of expression), the revivals of Confucianism and 
Marxism, and Chinese nationalism and patriotism. While each of these have 
entire fields of research themselves, my research will narrow down these 
movements to linked motivations and effects that each movement had on China’s 
hackers and hacker culture. There are several works in the field that can greatly 
aid my research. Kevin O’Brien’s Popular Protest in China (Harvard University 
Press, 2008) has chapters outlining student movements and contention in 
cyberspace. In China’s Future: The Path to Prosperity and Peace (Enrich 
Professional Publishing, 2013), Jim Canrong illustrates the changing ideologies 
that underline Chinese culture. He describes and analyzes the cultural changes 
over the last two decades, which sheds light on the background of Chinese social 
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change. Works like these are essential in the understanding of the Chinese 
individual and their choices to join hacker groups, which is what is missing today 
from the field. 
 When one analyzes the research that others have done on the topic of 
Chinese cybercrime and the culture of hackers within China, there is a single 
resounding opinion that tends to be misleading. Much of the work published on 
this subject points toward one category of actor as the root of all illegal actions: 
the Chinese government or a subsidiary. In reality, the government is just one 
piece of a very large puzzle. There are many organizations that support the claim 
of government rooted activities, two of which include the Washington Times and 
Mandiant Inc, both of whom have published articles or reports linking cyber-
attacks to the PLA. The Washington Times argues that there is a significant 
correlation between the growth of Chinese cyber-intelligence and the attacks on 
American corporations. In their article “China Investing in Cyberwarfare 
Superiority,” Bill Geerts writes that “they [the Chinese government] have stolen 
hundreds of billions of dollars of intellectual property from U.S. businesses and 
continue to commit this theft. The Chinese have now increased their capability to 
conduct massive attacks and continue to consider this weapon as a primary tool 
in their arsenal.”9 This is a great example of western media biases, as 
publications like the Washington Times have a propensity to attribute all cyber-
attacks that emanate from Asia to the Chinese government regardless of the 
                                                          
9 Gertz, Bill. "Cheers to Good Frenemies! China Investing in Cyberwarfare Superiority." The 
Washington Times. April 1, 2015. Accessed March 28,  2016. 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/apr/1/china-invests-cyberwarfare-compete-us-
military/?page=all 
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complexities of the Chinese hacking community. 
  Many media outlets, like the Washington Times for example, have a 
tendency to fuel debate for sensational reasons, and global cybercrime is no 
different. A simple story of the Chinese government running a nefarious and well-
coordinated ring of cybercriminals will perhaps draw in readers for whom this 
story validates a worldview. In reality, the individuals responsible are not always 
state-sponsored, but usually have a broad spectrum of motivations. One key 
element that sets the Chinese hacker culture apart from the stereotypical western 
hacker is the deep-rooted nationalism of so many Chinese hackers. This can be 
seen throughout times of political conflict with other countries, as individuals and 
hacker groups become especially active. This is an aspect that my preliminary 
research has found is not commonly covered by the media and other academics.  
  There is support for the research, but finding work that gives a modern 
collective view of the field is extremely difficult. One of the few academic texts 
written on the subject of Chinese hackers and nationalism is Henderson’s The 
Dark Visitor. It is one of the few and only books devoted exclusively to this topic. 
Henderson’s text was published in 2007, and provides he no follow-up. This is 
much the case with this field of study. Much of the information becomes outdated 
quickly because motivations, the relevant technology, and the nature of attacks 
change dramatically. This can be attributed to the growth and fluidity of the 
subject base, as well as a language barrier for most western academics. 
  Since 2006, the spotlight has been increasingly focused on cyberattacks 
and what some consider an escalating cyberwar. Research that links China to 
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global attacks has an origin around this time. Some of the first information 
published was on the Red Hacker Alliance which started as an online protest 
movement by activists. The research for this study extends to our era, when 
online activism in China first found its voice. 
  One of the most common counter-arguments emanating from Chinese 
sources is that the United States is in fact the greatest perpetrator of cyber-
espionage and cyber-attacks. In an interview performed by myself with a former 
member of Anonymous Serbia, the individual stated that “At this point, it's certain 
that ALL governments, including USA and China, are using hackers in order to 
gain an advantage over other countries. This goes not only in intelligence 
gathering but probably often as part of the effort  to destabilise the economy of 
others.”10 The most significant agencies within the U.S. are the FBI, the NSA, 
and the CIA. The United States has multiple agencies that have internet-based 
resources and cyber capabilities. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) runs 
an Internet surveillance program called Carnivore that allows U.S. officials the 
ability to intercept and collect electronic communications. The National Security 
Agency (NSA) was established in 1952 to act as a focal point for Signals 
Intelligence (SIGINT) and Communications Security (COMSEC), with sub-
divisions in Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronics Intelligence 
(ELINT).11 Communications signals are collected by the NSA around the world, 
processes, and if deemed necessary, are given to other agencies like the CIA 
                                                          
10 Uzunovic, Agan. “Chinese Hackers.” E-mail interview by author. April 5, 2016 
11 Janczewski, Lech, and Andrew M. Colarik. Cyber Warfare and Cyber Terrorism. Hershey: 
Information Science Reference, 2008. P. 459 
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and the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency).  
  One of the most proligic government agencies with cyber capabilities in 
the NSA. Director of the NSA, General Lew Allen, gave a public overview of the 
responsibilities of the NSA as “directing foreign intelligence, obtained from 
foreign electrical communications… foreign intelligence derived from these 
signals is then reported to various agencies of the government in response to 
their approved requirements for foreign intelligence.”12 The agency itself is not 
devoted entirely to cyber-warfare, but it does have sub-divisions that have 
mastered the cyber-landscape. The TAO unit (Tailored Access Operations) is 
one of these groups, and is commonly deployed for specific targets, to hack 
difficult systems, tap cellular phone networks, or to implant surveillance 
devices.13 The NSA has another similar group called the Red Team. Its main 
component was probing for vulnerabilities in new hardware and software that had 
been designed for the Defense Department. The People Daily published an 
article in response to the cyber-capabilities of the American government and 
military in which it is proclaimed that:  
Western hostile forces… use the network, and relying on computers, 
mobile phones and other such information terminals, maliciously attack 
our Party, … arouse mistaken thinking trends of historical nihilism, with the 
ultimate goal of using “universal values” to mislead us, using 
                                                          
12 Janczewski, Lech, and Andrew M. Colarik. Cyber Warfare and Cyber Terrorism. Hershey: 
Information Science Reference, 2008. P. 460 
13 Wexler, Evan, and Elias Mallette. "How the NSA’s Secret Elite Hacking Unit Works." PBS. May 
29, 2014. Accessed January 19, 2016. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/how-the-nsas-
secret-elite-hacking-unit-works/ 
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“constitutional democracy” to throw us into turmoil, use “colour revolutions” 
to overthrow us, use negative public opinion and rumours to oppose us, 
and use “de-partification and depoliticization of the military” to upset us.14 
 Outside the United States, countries like Russia and Iran also dominate 
the cyber-landscape. While Russia’s cyber-capabilities are far behind the United 
States, they are a trailblazer in the area of cyberwarfare. In 1999, the Russian 
nation-state was charged with hacking the American military network in what is 
now known as Moonlight Maze. Kevin Mandia, who later went on to start the 
security company Mandiant, was sent by the American government to interview 
individuals in Moscow. While there he concluded that “the Russian government 
had been the hacker, working through servers of the academy of sciences.”15 
While in Russia, political hackers strongly showed their skill in assaulting and 
immobilizing the communication of Estonia in 2007, as well as in Georgia in 
2008. During a time of armed conflict in 2008, at the precise moment when tanks 
and planes crossed the South Ossetian Line, fifty-four Georgian websites- 
related to mass media, finance, government ministries, police, and armed forces- 
were hacked and, along with the nation’s entire internet service rerouted to 
Russian servers, which shut them down.16 Speaking to student cadets in 
September 2010 in Orebburg, the Russian president bluntly stated, “the 
                                                          
14 Cindy. "Re-Defining Cyberspace - China Digital Times (CDT)." China Digital Times (CDT). 
October 09, 2015. Accessed May 01, 2016. http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/10/re-defining-
cyberspace/.  
15 Kaplan, Fred M. Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War. New York, NY: Simon and 
Schuster, 2016. P. 87 
16 Kaplan, Fred M. Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War. New York, NY: Simon and 
Schuster, 2016. P.164 
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computer today is now no less important of a weapon than an automatic weapon 
or a tank.”17   
  Iranian hackers have also shown significant hacking talent.  Google CEP 
Eric Schmidt indicated that "Iranians are unusually talented in cyber war for some 
reason we don’t fully understand".18 Iran is now considered an emerging military 
power in the field. US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta warned that Iran has 
“undertaken a concerted effort to use cyberspace to its advantage”.19 Iran 
was reported in 2013 to have hacked U.S. Navy computers, in one of the most 
serious infiltrations from the Middle East to date.20 
 Outside of state hacking groups, there has been a rise in independent 
hacking groups. Anonymous, by far, is the most well-known hacktivist association 
worldwide. The various individuals that make up the group Anonymous are 
unified by the conviction that organizations and administrations they deem 
corrupt should be confronted or even assaulted.21 One example of this is the 
2010 campaign “Operation: Payback” (as seen below), which saw the 
Anonymous group attack MPAA (Motion Picture Association of America) and 
RIAA (Recording Industry of America) in retaliation for their attacks on the torrent 
site ThePirateBay. The group its roots from the online image-based bulletin 
board 4chan, which started in 2003. The title "Anonymous" was inspired by the 
                                                          
17 “Speech at opening of the first Presidential Cadet Academy,” September 1, 2010, 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/transctipts/865. 
18 Joshi, Shashank. "Iran, the Mossad and the Power of Cyber-warfare – Telegraph Blogs." The 
Telegraph. October 3, 2013. Accessed December 17, 2016.  
19 Ibid 
20 Ibid 
21 "A History of Anonymous." InfoSec. InfoSec Institute, October 24, 2011. Accessed March 30, 
2016. http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/a-history-of-anonymous/ 
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perceived anonymity in which users were able to communicate and post on 
4chan.22 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Anonymous Video Screenshot and Logo. The logo commonly 
associated with the hacking group Anonymous.23 The second picture is a 
screenshot of one of Anonymous’ videos after an ISIS attack on Brussels.24 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22 Stanek, Becca. "How Did Anonymous Start? The History Of The Mysterious "Hacktivist" Group 
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Figure 2: Operation Payback Message. The post left by the hacktivist group 
Anonymous following attacks on the MPAA and the RIAA in retaliation for their 
actions on the site ThePirateBay.25
                                                          
25 Wharton, Michael. "Twittocracy, Interactivism, Hacktivism, and Cyber-Anarchy: Cause." There 
Is Always a Theory: Politics, Anarchy, Religion, Atheism, and Science. October 12, 2010. 
Accessed January 14, 2016. http://www.michaelwharton.co.uk/2010/10/twittocracy-interactivism-
hacktivism-cyber-anarchy-cause/  
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CHAPTER ONE  
SHAPING THE FOUNDATIONS 
 The cultural identity of China has been in a state of flux and even chaos 
throughout the twentieth century. From the fall of imperial China in 1911, through 
the warlord era and the Japanese invasion, civil war, Communist victory, famine 
and the Cultural Revolution, the political changes in China have had a profound 
impact on the cultural identity of the diverse population of the PRC. Over the last 
few decades, since the death of Chinese Communist Party Chairman, Mao 
Zedong in 1976, the identities and cultures of China have shown no sign of 
slowing their relentless transformation and reinvention. Social movements have 
helped create and define new forms of Chinese identity. Movements like the 
democracy and activist movements throughout the 1980s, the Chinese netizen 
movements, the revival of Confucianism and Maoism, and the creation of new 
forms of patriotism and nationalism have come together with the aid of 
technological adaptations to provide the first hacker groups with a new and 
potentially powerful means to voice their beliefs. The current movements that 
have helped establish a Chinese online identity also play a very important role in 
the lives and actions of online activists who make up the hacker world. 
  Since 1979, social and economic reforms have led to a radical 
transformation of Chinese society. Individuals are now free to move from one 
place to another with the loosening of “household registration” (hukou) policies. 
On the other hand, individualization and the power of self-interest over the group 
has emerged along with these freedoms. Activism and protests that pertain to 
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forms of individualization and rising self-interest have become increasingly 
common recently in contrast to the predominantly collective mentality of the Mao 
years (1949-1976), and, some would argue, the Confucian collective and familial 
bonds of pre-revolutionary China. Many observers within China bemoan the rise 
of a greedy and self-centered generation in China, with the lifting of economic 
restrictions and the implementation of the “One-Child Policy” also as factors in 
possibly fostering a generation of self-interested and materialistic young people 
in China. But individualization can also be a strong and beneficial social force 
that allows people to identify their specific needs and interests, and then organize 
socially and politically in a way that favors their sub-group. Examining the hukou 
system, a household registration system that also records social categorizations, 
and social circles in Beijing, the analysis examines the individualization and in a 
sense, the atomization, of contemporary Chinese society. Farmers are protesting 
against local government; migrant workers are fighting for a decent salary; 
activist organizations are fighting for protection of the environment; and women 
are fighting for equality. The rise in these sub-groups has fueled a growing 
culture of individualization where individuals in these groups are fighting for 
cultural acceptance, concrete economic gain, and social equality. 
 As China moves further into the twenty-first century, social activism is 
flourishing, with an increased number of social movements. Many of these social 
movements in China are still at a nascent stage, and here is something really 
new: a generation of younger China scholars that are beginning to explore the 
richness of China’s emerging culture of contention with new tools at their 
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disposal. 
  Since the early 1990s, there has been a constant rise in the reporting of 
social unrest in China. Reported incidents of social unrest rose from 8,700 in 
1994, to 90,000 by 2006, and by 2008 to 127,000.26 Even before the Tiananmen 
massacre of June 4, 1989, tensions between the Chinese Communist Party and 
individuals and groups within Chinese society had been escalating for decades. 
Even now, in the view of many observers, there is a growing divide between a 
dynamic economy and vibrant society, and a repressive, archaic system of 
governance and political control. These recent changes in the 1990s have been 
hopefully labeled by some as the development of “grassroots democracy.” 
According to Huang Weiping and Chen Jiaxi of Shenzhen University, “from 
village elections, China’s grassroots democracy has undergone a 
multidimensional expansion, i.e. from the village to the city, from grassroots 
society to grassroots government, from outside of the ruling party to within the 
party, and from democratic election to democratic governance. This tendency 
indicates the growth of China’s grassroots democracy in terms of width and 
depth. China’s democratization is in steady progress and is gradually realizing 
the legitimate political rights of citizens and CPC members in the written laws.”27 
The optimism of Huang and Chen is considerable, and it is also noteworthy that 
they are dating these new developments and this social ferment to  precisely the 
era in which the hackers that I am studying are coming of age and taking part in 
                                                          
26 Baum, Systematic Stresses and  Choices: China’s Road to Soft Authoritarian Reform. 2004 
27 Weiping, Huang, and Chen Jiaxi. “China’s Grassroots Democracy: Development and 
Assessment.” International Journal of China Studies. 2.2 (2011): 177-211. 
ics.um.edu.my/images/ics/IJCSV2N2/IJCSV2N2-huangchen.pdf 
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their society as adults. 
  The individuals that comprise of the “Tiananmen generation” are involved 
in this new upsurge in political and social action. The knowledge and lessons 
learned from the events in 1989 have provided a new collective identity as a new 
political generation. This generation has an awareness of a movement that was 
repressed and crushed by its own government, and it assists in maintaining an 
intensity of public involvement even amidst the cynicism, wariness, or fury. These 
lessons influence modern activist positions as environmentalists and 
conservationists, human rights campaigners, and advocates of written law. The 
circumstances that contributed to the ascension to the modern civilian activism 
help illuminate the importance of the early movement to further a cause for 
democracy. The rise of the middle class, the advent of the internet and steadily 
increasing access, globalization, the maturing of a newer generation, and other 
factors have all combined to shape recent Chinese activism.  
 
The Fight for Democracy 
  Struggles for democracy in China have taken many divergent forms, and 
emerge from the twentieth century and tumultuous eras like the May Fourth 
Movement and the Cultural Revolution. But calls for democracy returned to the 
forefront of Chinese culture with the events of the 1980s leading to the world-
famous Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. This popular movement 
paradoxically marked both the high-water mark of democratic movements and 
optimism in modern China but also its low point. The military crackdown on June 
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4th shattered these democratic ideals. 
  The reason that the push for democracy and the outlying movements in 
the 1990s are so significant is that it has led to many of the issues and 
movements of today, and in turn fuels the actions of Chinese activists. China has 
quickly revolutionized into a market economy since 1979. In the wave of the 
blatant repression of 1989, Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping set in motion 
the reform agendas of 1992, but at severe costs. The compromise of forestalling 
political reform for the sake of astounding economic growth has been a bargain 
many in China have accepted, though not without some opposition. As China 
sustains impressive amounts of economic development, the country encounters 
environmental degradation, corruption, and social polarization. For example, in 
2010 the price of ecological dilapidation in China was about $230 billion USD, 
and since taking office in 2012, President Xi has vowed to bring down both 
“tigers and flies” in his anti-corruption campaign, going after both top 
administrators as well low-level officials.28 This purge of corrupt officers and 
administrators like Shanghai vice mayor Ai Baojun, who supervised an important 
economic district, as well as a senior CCP official from Beijing named Lu 
Xiwen.29  The prevalence of corruption has long been a source of deep 
frustration among Chinese activists, and indeed this was a major pillar of the 
Tiananmen protests. 
                                                          
28 Wong, Edward. "Cost of Environmental Damage in China Growing Rapidly Amid 
Industrialization." The New York Times. 2013. Accessed February 1, 2016. 
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  Today, an upsurge of protests and social activism is spreading through 
China. Compared to the incident in 1989, these new protests are more diverse, 
often more clearly and narrowly defined, and generally more moderate. New 
problems have moved to the forefront, encompassing everything from the before 
mentioned environmental protection, to the protection of ostracized social 
classifies, to legal reform, and anti-discrimination. To this day liberty and equality 
are still motivating principles, but protesters and advocates are not using the 
same outright and confrontational tactics of massive and coordinated protest, as 
was seen in 1989, and also in the Jasmine Revolution that swept across Arab 
countries in 2011.  
  Many of these new movements in China use the law in their struggle to 
protect citizen’s rights. They also have adopted non-combative methods of 
engagement, and make clever manipulation of the internet to construct a solid 
foundation for their organizations. In January 2013, Hong Kong professor Benny 
Tai suggested the “Occupy Central with Love and Peace” effort, in an attempt to 
compel the government to endow unadulterated democracy to Hong Kong in 
arrangement with quasi-constitution that existed in Hong Kong.30 In response in 
June 2014, approximately 800,000 Hong Kong citizens voted in approval of 
democracy in an unsanctioned vote prepared by the same effort that Benny 
suggested. The next month, approximately 500,000 individuals paraded for 
democracy in a movement that continued through the end of the year.  This is a 
unique movement in a unique or “special” autonomous region of China.  Hong 
                                                          
30 "World Report 2015: China." Human Rights Watch. 2015. Accessed September 30, 2016. 
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Kong’s urban protests have not spilled into the mainland, but surely they were 
noticed by many there.31 
 
China and the Internet 
  The greatest form of political action amongst the newest generation in 
China is almost certainly online activism. In this modern era dominated by the 
internet, Chinese activists are both structured but also spread out, but there is no 
question that they comprise a formidable potential force of social change. 
However, online activism is predominantly conversational and representational, 
comprising written objections in virtual forums, as well as websites dedicated to 
protest movements and online petitions. Despite government censorship of 
cyberspace, the more powerful of these cultural ideals disperse online at 
incredible speeds, which in turn can become unofficial national media events. 
The quickness and simplicity of the internet make it an efficient medium for the 
expression of criticisms, challenging authority, and expressing dissent.  
  The growth of the internet as well as the explosion of the reliance on 
mobile devices has helped facilitate popular activism all over the globe. Thanks 
to the internet and social networks, young Chinese born in the 1990s were born 
into a culture that has the potential to learn about the values of democracy, 
freedom, and human rights, even if they do not necessarily share American 
perspectives on these concepts. In Shifang, a county-level city in Sichuan, China, 
students testify that they frequently elude government internet restrictions in 
                                                          
31 "World Report 2015: China." Human Rights Watch. 2015. Accessed September 30, 2016. 
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order to access sites that are barred.32 They refer to this as “jumping the wall”, 
and by “jumping the wall” they mean the Great Fire Wall, which is a country wide 
program used to sensor the internet in China. China established internet 
connectivity in 1994, and it now boasts the greatest number of internet users on 
Earth. A critical influence in the growth and expansion of the internet in China is 
that it fulfills imperative social desires including the need for information and 
communication.  
  The writer of Chinese Hacker History/Looking Back on the Chinese 
Hacker History, Chu Tianbi, states that hacking in China commenced in 1994 as 
the citizens first became users of the internet, even if overall internet use was 
mainly restricted to “science and technology research personnel” and “rich young 
people.” 33  Operators functioned on 9,600-bit/second modems and connected 
straight into Bulletin Board System (BBS) servers.34 In term of internet access 
today, the connection speed that these individuals operated on was extremely 
slow. As Chinese users were introduced to new computer programs, they started 
to decipher them practically instantaneously due to their enthrallment. It would 
not be until 1995 that users in China would be able to experience proficient 
internet service, as some area around mid-sized cities installed their own internet 
services and connections. Chu explains this opening stage by asserting: “In their 
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view, moving from BBS to the Internet was an expansion of their stage and 
allowed them to see a bit more.”35  
 Ever since this opening of the internet landscape like Chu describes, 
internet use in the country has been increasing at a remarkable speed. The 
expert on data associated with the Internet in China, the China Internet Network 
Information Center, released a publication in 2009 demonstrating that the country 
had achieved 298 million online users by the end of the previous year, with an 
unparalleled 279 million broadband operators.36 Both of these combined made 
China at the time, the greatest consumer of the internet.  
 A publication named “Surveying Internet Usage and Impact in Seven 
Chinese Cities” created by the Research Center for Social Development, 
provides an assessment of the internet in China in which research was 
performed by means of door-to-door interviews throughout the seven most 
populated cities within the country in an attempt to explore the consumption of 
the internet.37 This examination demonstrates that online users in China are 
extraordinarily young. For example, the percentage of implementation for 
individuals 24 and younger is over 80 percent. For the adoption rate is between 
60 and 80 percent of those users are between the ages of 25 and 29. That 
means adoption rate for individuals under the age of 30 is extremely high, and 
that the bulk of people under this age are internet operators. The highest internet 
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adoption rate belongs to males (57.2 percent), those who are in secondary 
education (90 percent), and single (77.2 percent).38  
  In recent years there has also been a push to cure what is called in China 
as internet addiction. According to the article “Breathing is Also an Addiction” by 
Hu Yong, this “So-called Internet addition refers to the repeated and excessive 
use of the Internet to the point that is becomes a kind of mental disorder. It can 
manifest itself as the intense desire to use the Internet repeatedly, and 
withdrawal symptoms are often observed when Internet use is decreased.”39 
According to Yong, approximately twenty million individuals in the country suffer 
from a type of internet addiction.40 It is even reported that the use of electric 
shock therapy on children have been employed to combat the effects of 
addiction.  
  The Chinese government and the general population have always had a 
very complex relationship with the internet, yet it is within this culture that 
individuals have grown very technologically knowledgeable due to the 
government’s censorship of the web and the “Great Firewall” as will be explored 
below. With the development of the Internet, this contention and improvisation 
has taken on some new forms. Popular protest began taking place in cyberspace 
from the earliest days of the internet in China. The first few years of internet 
diffusion in China saw only scattered reports of internet protests. It was not until 
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1996, that the internet became a significant forum for social protest, prompting an 
unprecedented response from the government. 
 
Golden Shield Project (The Great Firewall of China) 
  In 1998, the Ministry of Public Security of the PRC introduced a 
multifaceted project christened “the Golden Shield”. The intent was to encourage 
“the adoption of advanced information and communication technology to 
strengthen central police control, responsiveness, and crime combating capacity, 
so as to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of police work.”41 The endeavor 
was initiated fully by 2003, demonstrating the potential to obstruct sensitive or 
banned material by fundamentally inhibiting entrance to webpages containing 
these types of materials by instantaneously sorting out sites that contain an 
amalgamation of pre-prescribed keywords.42 The idea of “internet sovereignty” 
was formally introduced legally in June 2010.43 It expands the Party’s assertion of 
national sovereignty to cyberspace as well, as the country essentially utilizes the 
right to regulator the stream of information from the internet as it reaches its 
citizens. This idea of internet sovereignty was once again brought by China to an 
international discussion during the World Internet Conference in December 2015, 
which was held in China’s Zhejiang province. It was during this event that 
President Xi Jingping gave a speech attempting to promote: 
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The transformation of the global system of internet governance… [while] 
respecting each country’s right to choose its own internet development 
path, its own internet management model, its own public policies on the 
internet, and to participate on an equal basis in the governance of 
international cyberspace — avoiding cyber-hegemony, and avoiding 
interference in the internal affairs of other countries.44  
The idea of the Chinese modern for internet governance expanding is not 
so far-fetched. Russia has long been an advocate of expansion. Russian 
authorities have employed the knowledge of Lu Wei, China’s internet authority, 
and Fang Binxing, known as the founder of the Firewall, in an attempt to “draw 
up plans for a national internet white list... [of] potential exposure to 
“’pornography, drugs, paedophiles,’ – scary words.”45 This seems to show that 
Russia is embracing the same “internet sovereignty” model that China has in the 
past, behind a model similar to China’s Great Firewall. 
  “Golden Shield” is widely known in popular media as the “Great Firewall of 
China.” The project essentially targets the online movements of individual 
operating online systems within China and the rest of the global internet. Dr 
Lennon Yao-Chung Chang, Assistant Professor and deputy program leader of 
the criminology program at the University of Hong Kong, described it as being “ 
built not only for political purposes, such as blocking websites or messages 
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relating to anti-government material or, pro-Taiwan and pro-Tibet matters, it was 
also used to monitor websites and block out those related to criminal activities.”46 
During times of the year that are deemed sensitive by authorities, thousands of 
websites go offline and web servers are shut down. In this sense, the Chinese 
government’s control over the internet involves not only content but also timing. 
  The various tools of state monitors of the internet include blocking specific 
search terms, shutting down specific websites, or slowing down connectivity of a 
user engaged in activity that is deemed unsavory by government censors. You 
cannot search for any information involving the Tiananmen massacre like the 
date June 4 for example.47 Equipped with a blacklist of undesirable IP addresses, 
routers drop all packets destined to block IPs, which could include the address of 
a sensitive site like the New York Times.48 As of April 2016, eight of the top 
twenty-five most heavily visited websites globally are censored in China, and 
according to the group at Greatfire.org, almost a quarter of the websites 
monitored by Chinese authorities end up blocked.49 Take the picture below for 
example, which shows that the site hrw.org has been blocked by Chinese 
censors. The individual is denied access to a certain page, because the site itself 
or the content on that specific page has triggered government censors. 
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Figure 3: HRW.org Censorship. The site hrw.org has been blocked by 
government censors. The page shows a message explaining that the page could 
not be found because of relevant laws and regulations.50 
 
Netizen Movement 
 The new and rapidly transforming culture that has surrounded the citizens 
of China has provided them with a unique opportunity, and has also allowed the 
creation of self-realizing sub-groups within the population. The profound diversity 
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and complexity of China continues to defy the hasty external prejudiced views of 
a homogeneous society that is completely and utterly oppressed. The internet 
has been shown to have had a profound effect on these individuals, yet the 
government has gone to great lengths to censor the information that is 
accessible. This culture has bred a new generation of individuals who are more 
familiar with the inner workings of cyberspace as a consequence of the 
restrictions placed upon them by their superiors. Firewalls, proxy servers, and 
backdoors are often a necessity for them to view information that would not 
otherwise be available. This movement is commonly referred to as the “Netizen 
movement” due to the fact that its individuals are often referred to as netizens, 
which is an abridgement for “internet citizen.” The term “netizen” was coined in a 
1992 article by Michael Hauben titled “The Net and Netizens: The Impact the Net 
Has on People’s Lives.” and spread rapidly.51 It is usually designated to 
individuals who are extremely immersed in cyber communities. Netizens are 
distinct from normal internet users in that their emphasis is with manipulating 
cyberspace as an instrument to participate in social activities, using the internet 
to increase their scope of social influence, and building more connections outside 
of their normal social circles. The use of the term netizen has now become nearly 
indistinguishable with Chinese internet users.  
  Although government restriction has helped create a very unique internet 
user collective, the government and internet activists can coexist and even 
cooperate with each other if the circumstances fulfill both groups’ ideologies.  
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This is especially true if netizen action contributes to the Chinese government’s 
agenda in any way. A prominent instance of such confluence was centered 
around the Olympic torch relay as it crossed France in April of 2008, before the 
Beijing Summer Games of that year. The global community debated the ethics of 
hosting the Games under the watchful eye of such an authoritarian regime. 
Tibetan independence advocates and human rights activists continually made an 
effort to impede the relay of the Olympic torch as it made its way through Paris. 
Adding more fuel to the fire, the city hall in Paris flew a Tibetan flag and 
displayed a banner that proclaimed, “Paris defends human rights throughout the 
world.”52  Furthermore, members of the French Parliament brought a halt to a 
National Assembly session to reveal a sigil that declared “Respect for Human 
Rights in China” while chanting “Freedom for Tibet!”53 The torch was forcibly 
extinguished five times amidst scuffles along the route, until the torch relay route 
was shortened and a town hall ceremony cancelled.54  
  In China there was a resounding response that started in the online 
community and quickly became physical. A chain of boycotts, protests, and 
assaults on any person or anything that represented France was implemented by 
thousands and perhaps millions of Chinese individuals. The hardest hit was the 
French retailer Carrefour, which had over one hundred shops in China at the 
time. There were countless cries throughout cyberspace to boycott goods and 
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merchandises from the French retailer.55 An article published online was even 
labeled , “Boycott French goods, let’s start with Carrefour.”56  This led to a 
congregation of approximately one thousand protesters outside a Carrefour store 
in the city of Wuhan, and it expanded to encompass the rest of China as well. 
Amidst the protests were accusations that retailer advocated for Tibetan 
independence and championed the cause of the Dalai Lama. (To be precise, the 
Dalai Lama does not currently advocate Tibetan independence, but rather 
increased autonomy and cultural freedom for the region.) It was contended that 
the episode turned out a public-relations catastrophe for the Chinese 
government, while some believed that the concentration of the attention that was 
placed upon the protestors as primarily upholding and portraying a sense of 
nationalism. The online campaign surrounding this and other related incidents 
reflected the confluence of popular netizen activism and the state agenda of 
promoting patriotism and China’s image abroad. 
  Another form of resistance that is common to the country is online 
hacktivism and related hacking endeavors, although these are considered highly 
controversial throughout the rest of the world. A significant example of this that is 
prevalent in China is government website defacement where a government or 
state organization’s webpage is hacked and a political message is left for the 
public’s viewing. In December 2008, the official website for the city’s Bureau of 
Commerce in Jingzhou was hacked and swapped with a picture of a woman 
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dressed in very revealing attire, with the photograph of the leader of the 
organization substituted with a statement suggesting immoral behavior on his 
part. Cases like this have a tendency to be linked to corruption of officials. 
Various other cases of hackers assaulting webpages in an attempt to stimulate 
political awareness are very common in media portrayals in today’s age. There 
are other significant examples of this; a Japanese webpage dedicated to the 
Yasukuni Shrine, where Japanese military personnel that seized China during 
World War II are being revered, including class A war criminals, was vandalized 
by a hacker collection out of China. 
The People’s Republic of China has executed a number of significant 
suppressions of webpages in China that were purportedly operating contrary to 
government guidelines. In 2004, two prominent organizations that provide blog 
services, BlogBus and Blogcn, were restricted to users for the short term due to 
offensive matter concerning the events in 1989 as well as the 2003 government 
management of the SARS incident.57 During 2005, the online crackdown by 
Chinese authorities escalated as authorities pursued not only the major 
webpages but, furthermore, the bulletin board systems of significant universities. 
This suppression led to very aggressive demonstrations in the form of two large 
student protests against the actions of the authorities.5859 
  Although it was covered up quickly, one of these demonstrations in 2005 
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took place at Tsinghua University and saw over one hundred students come 
together in protest. The students also requested that the institution resist the 
government. The school was under pressure by authorities to restrict their 
internet privileges to only those within the university. This essentially meant that 
public servers would be shut down. That would have meant that public users, 
who make important contribution to the conversation, are not able to access 
these BBS any more.60 A comparable protest of approximately two hundred 
individuals took place at Nanjing University. Disapproval of the government’s 
response extended throughout the country with media articles with headings like 
“Universities Should Not Build Walls Around the Internet.”61 
 
Nationalism 
Nationalism has developed into one of the more significant influences 
behind group actions, albeit it is a somewhat contemporary trend that followed 
the birth of the modern countries in Europe in the nineteenth century and then 
throughout the rest of the world. In Imagined Communities by Benedict 
Anderson, a nation is an “imagined community” that has been socially 
constructed by individuals who imagine themselves as part of a larger 
collective.62 It is this idea of “community” creates a larger sense of nationalism. 
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For some observers, there is much to criticize in China’s rush to modernity and 
global prominence in the past forty years: the crackdown on Tiananmen Square 
in 1989, the long history of governmental censorship, the brutal eviction of poor 
residents outside of cities during redevelopment projects, a draconian population 
policy, cultural chauvinism at China’s ethnic frontiers, human rights violations, 
and much more.  
  During the first three decades of communist power, Marxist philosophy 
went hand in hand with nationalism. Since the late 1970s, however, these 
ideologies have been supplanted by economic principles, and nationalism has 
become one of the strongest forces that push these ideologies into the more 
modern era. This was particularly accurate after the 1989 government crackdown 
on protests in Tiananmen Square and elsewhere. As related to China’s youth, 
nationalism has been a driving force in the developments of both the political and 
cultural realms of the nation. The internet has provided an entirely new place for 
individuals to share and build upon nationalist sentiment, especially among the 
idealistic youth. The summer of 2003 is one example. This was a time that 
exhibited a rising anti-Japanese sentiment among Chinese youth. Tensions grew 
out of issues surrounding the disputed Diaoyu or Senkaku islands in the East 
China Sea, which were a growing tension between the two nations. A popular 
movement emerged later that year, and escalated into a signed petition of over 
ten thousand individuals opposing the use of Japanese technology in a high-
speed train under development. 2003 also was a significant step forward for 
online nationalism. Without a doubt, it is this emotion that was replicated to night 
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precision on a webpage linked to the Red Hacker Alliance (to be examined 
further below) called Iron and Blood Union (tiě ér xuèyè shètuán). The site 
expressed the standpoint of the group by stating that “The goal of this 
community: Is to grieve for the prior generation and to never forget the nation’s 
shame; to use history as an example for facing the future.”63  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Nationalism:  An International Comparison. Note: Nationalism is an 
imputed factor index of four survey questions. The scale ranges from 0 to 100. 
Source: National Identity Survey II, International Social Survey Programme, 
2003, and 2008 China Survey. 
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 Chinese nationalism and national identity construction have garnered 
much attention in recent years. Pro-China demonstrations in 2008 during the 
Olympic torch relay as well as anti-Japanese demonstrations in spring 2005, 
September 2010, and September 2012, have raised concerns abroad about the 
nature of Chinese nationalism and national identity. Indeed some observers 
believe that these protests raise concerns in Beijing about its own ability to 
control this kind of nationalist sentiment.  
  Most analysts agree that nationalism is currently a powerful source of 
legitimacy for the CCP and its hold on power.64 The figure above represents a 
National Identity Survey that indexes nationalism of the global community. On a 
scale from 0 to 100 based on survey questions given to the public, China ranks 
first with a rating of 80, followed closely by the United States at 76. To further 
analyze national identity in the country, students at Beijing University (1,346 total) 
were asked to take part in a survey in spring 2007.65 This survey found that both 
Chinese Communist Party supporters and individuals with rural upbringings 
showed greater levels of nationalism than individuals who did not fall under either 
category. The Communist party regards students and young people in urban 
areas as more likely to participate in protest movements over foreign policy 
issues, which makes this segment of the population “most likely of greatest 
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concern to Chinese leaders.”66 Students have been active in some of the 
Chinese nationalist movements and other protest movements, but we know little 
about their unfiltered opinions, perhaps with the exception of those who are 
active online. It is within recent research like the university survey were it has 
become evident that Chinese nationalism is a growing phenomenon  
This research comes to five conclusions. First, in the Chinese context, 
nationalism and patriotism are fundamentally distinct, but have a significant effect 
on those who were interviewed. According to Oxford English dictionary, 
nationalism is defined as a patriotic sentiment; and patriotism as a passionate 
protection of the nation’s success and independence from which they identify.67 
Chinese nationalism centers on the idea of returning China to its former 
greatness prior to the late Qing era and the fall of the imperial system. Patriotism 
differs from nationalism in China as it usually pertains to individuals with a sense 
of responsibility to both the nation and the Party. The second conclusion of the 
research states that nationalism has stronger links with foreign policy 
predilections than that of patriotism. “Patriots” and “nationalists” differed in their 
views in all other foreign policy statements except for the statement concerning 
Taiwan, which indicates that the Taiwan issue seems to unite people with 
otherwise different views. In the 2007 data, only 6.8 per cent of respondents 
were against or strongly against the use of force if Taiwan declared 
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independence.6869  Third, the answer to the research question of whether  
Chinese individuals who are more nationalistic differ from less nationalistic 
Chinese in their foreign policy attitudes is clearly a resounding yes. The political 
attitudes of Chinese citizens are very much reflective upon their nationalistic 
qualities. This research has shown that compared to nationalism, patriotism in 
China is connected with more accommodating and globalized outlooks, whereas 
the other individuals have a tendency back economic security. Nationalism is 
usually linked to the idea of a greater “China,” while patriotism is linked to the 
Communist party. It is also true that nationalistic online behavior offers protection 
in opposition to government enquiry and potential intervention, since it is clearly 
not undermining the cultural and political authority of the government, at least on 
the surface. By PRC criteria, this encompasses a significantly sized collection of 
peoples with shared connections that are hard to supervise and regulate. Within 
China, a hacking organization could find itself censored, broken up, and even 
subjected to legal punishment of they become an opposition and do not show 
support for the PRC or the CCP.  
 In the world of Chinese hackers, nationalism and patriotism are very 
similar. Individuals who are labeled “patriotic hackers” usually follow a more 
nationalistic sense, as in, they are more worried about China as a whole and not 
so much the Communist party. The term “patriotic” hacker is more common in the 
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western work than “nationalistic” hacker. Chinese hackers include both qualities 
that comprise of nationalism and patriotism. 
  The growth of the internet as well as the explosion of the reliance on 
mobile devices has helped facilitate popular activism all over the globe. Thanks 
to the internet and social networks, young Chinese born in the 1990s were born 
into a culture that has the potential to learn about the values of democracy, 
freedom, and human rights. Nationalism has developed into one of the more 
significant influences behind group actions. In the past, Marxism and government 
ideologies went hand in hand with nationalism. Even today the government 
attempts to facilitate nationalistic values. There is a relevant phenomenon called 
the 50 Cent Party in which the government pays individuals to post fake 
comments on internet pages to promote the government’s ideologies. These 
individuals gain their name because these individuals are supposedly paid “50 
cents of Renminbi” for every post.70 
  In January 2016, the agency in charge of censorship of the internet in 
China convened at the National Online Propaganda Work Conference with the 
focus of specific tasks. According to the People’s Daily, the agency called for a 
focus on, “deepening online propaganda… so that the theoretical innovations 
and practical achievements of the Party become the lofty main tone and main 
theme of the online space,” as well as “fully leveraging websites, online social 
organisations and internet users, achieving comprehensive [internet] 
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management through multiparty execution of policies.”71 This shows that the 
Party’s management of the internet and of its users continue even now, and will 
continue into the future. Although from a western perspective this sounds 
incredibly bad, in China and in President Xi Jingping’s mind, it is most definitely 
not. The president calls in “spreading positive energy”, and it follows the idea that 
the country can transform itself it the face of ever-changing public opinion that 
have been challenged by new technologies.72 So, there are very good intentions 
behind the Party’s control of the internet as positive energy is intended to 
contribute the mobilization of the populace behind the party.  
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CHAPTER TWO:  
WHAT DEFINES THE HACKER CULTURE? 
A new culture has developed in China in which some expressions of 
beliefs can be deemed unacceptable and censored in various forums. These 
constraints on some kinds of expression on sensitive topics were most obviously 
apparent in the government’s actions in suppressing the 1989 protests, and a 
powerfully chilling effect has been seen in many forums and venues of public 
expression. Many who sought to speak their minds on some sensitive topics 
usually constrained their communication to their immediate social circles. This 
became the status quo immediately after Tiananmen, and would remain so until 
the explosion of the internet midway through the 1990s. Then individuals found a 
new platform and while still circumscribed in some ways, there were efforts to 
keep the internet as a forum for free expression. This sometimes involved and 
still involves coded references to sensitive political events (like “May 35” as a 
reference to June 4, 1989), but creative and savvy efforts have continued to push 
the limits of expression on the internet within China, beginning in the 1990s. In 
this regard, one can say that this new Chinese culture led to the creation and 
growth of a hacker culture, as well as further defining what exactly a hacker 
culture is on the global scale. Since 1999, online public opinion has gone through 
three distinct phases: infancy, development, and expansion. These phases begin 
with the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade (more on this later) when 
the People’s Daily established forums for public opinion. This phase escalated 
into yet another in 2003 in what is known as “the year of online public opinion”, 
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where online conviction first swayed government policy. Finally, the country 
moved into the last phase of independent interpersonal communications, 
collaboration, and involvement acknowledged as Web 2.0.73 Throughout these 
phases a new sub-culture emerged.  
  The term “hacker” was initially attributed to individuals who can modify 
computer systems and programs in an attempt to accomplish tasks that were 
beyond the inherent or intended design of the system.74 However, as technology 
advanced and the true power of computer hacking was unleashed, individuals 
from all walks of life soon discovered the utility of hacking as well as its 
destructive and criminal capabilities. Hacking now extends to include organized 
gangs attempting to steal financial information, state-affiliated espionage groups 
who steal massive amounts of intellectual property, saboteurs and anarchists 
attempting to destroy critical infrastructures, and other actors. There are also 
countless small-scale criminals launching attacks for a wide variety of reasons.  
  Most popular preconceptions about computer hackers reasonably include 
a criminal view. We should note from the outset, though, that this is no longer the 
case. Governments and state-sponsored actors, including the United States, 
China, and many others now employ cybersecurity experts whose duties include 
not only defense, but also offensive cyber espionage and hacking. There is a 
large group within the broader hacking community that uses their computer 
prowess for legal gains.  
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  There is also a youthful shift as new generations are raised in a world 
where so much of daily life and daily interaction takes place online. Majid Yar, 
professor of Sociology at the University of Hull, believes that there is a “youth 
problem” in hacking around the world. Yar attributes two significant factors to the 
youth movement in hacking, which tends to have an overwhelming male hacker 
presence as well as being university dropouts in their twenties.75 Yar points to 
youth as a stage of unavoidable psychological chaos. This has a tendency to 
lead to involvement in different types of criminal conduct.  He also suggests the 
“ethical deficit” among these youths that lead them towards illegal behavior. This 
new generation of computer hackers, raised in a computer-based globalized 
world, push the boundaries of what is acceptable due to a great variety of 
motivations. These motivations can potentially make each individual hacker 
different, but they also help us to broadly classify and understand these 
individuals.  
  Hackers are commonly categorized into one of three classes depending 
on the individual’s or group motivations: black hat, white hat, and grey hat 
hackers. Those who are classified as black hat hackers tend to be the most 
dangerous. They tend to explore criminal ventures, revenge, sabotage, or illegal 
financial gain. This financial gain could include the theft of money, products, 
resources, blueprints or plans, or services. Black hat hackers can vary from 
beginners just starting to learn their way around systems by distributing malware, 
which are software programs that are created with the intent to harm or perform 
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further unsolicited activities  on a computer system, to skilled professionals with 
intent to pilfer information.76 White-hat hackers tend to explore security 
weaknesses in an attempt to strengthen or develop more secure computer 
systems, for the sake of industry knowledge and/or for legal financial gain. White 
hat hackers can be freelancers or employees of businesses as security 
consultants that are paid to intentionally break into systems to find security 
issues.77 Grey hat hackers are the weakest and least dangerous of the three. 
They explore systems and their weaknesses perhaps out of personal curiosity, to 
achieve notoriety amongst their immediate social groups, or purely for self-
fulfillment. Grey hat hackers usually do not cause harm to their targets, “they’re 
just looking to get something out of their discoveries for themselves.”78 According 
to Peng Yinan, one of China’s most prolific hackers, “Chinese hackers are similar 
to Western meanings and really nothing more that the three types: black hat 
hackers (hei maozi), white hat hackers (bai maozi), and grey hat hackers (hui 
maozi).”79 
  Hackers perform attacks or infiltrate systems for a variety of reasons. 
These motivations can include testing their skills, gaining recognition, making 
money, and supporting a political agenda. Some hack alone, and some hack in 
groups. Modern computer hackers attack or infiltrate systems in a variety of 
ways. While it is very easy to get lost in the terminology found in the world of 
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hacking, there are a few significant types of attacks that are common and for the 
sake of this study, they should be sketched out in brief: phishing/malware, SQL 
injection, DDOS, insider threat/theft, and vulnerability exploits. The figure below 
shows the attack cycle that is most common, with cyber-attacks starting with 
defining the target and ending with covering up tracks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Advanced Persistent Threat Lifecycle.80 
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Table 1: Common Types of Hacking Attacks 
Type of Attack Definition 
Phishing This is a form of deception where 
the assailant attempts to gather 
personal information like login 
identifications, or identity information 
through email, instant messages, and 
other channels. Often times the attacker 
uses reputable names or fraudulent 
claims to attract individuals into initiating 
communication.  
Malware These are software programs 
designed to damage, freeze, or perform 
any other unwanted actions without the 
knowledge of the user. Common 
examples include viruses, spyware, and 
“Trojan horses.” A Trojan horse 
program is usually 
malevolent/destructive in nature and 
commonly concealed inside another 
program or downloadable data.  
SQL Injection (Structured Query 
Language) 
This is a form of security exploit 
in which the systems infiltrator adds 
SQL code in an attempt to obtain 
entrance to information or resources, or 
to make system changes. This type of 
attack allows the attacker to gain 
access to information systems through 
automated tools, which increases the 
scope and overall damage to computer 
systems. 
DDoS (Distributed denial-of-
service) 
A DDoS strike is when a variety 
of systems assault a lone objective. 
Essentially, a flood of messages force 
the system to shut down, resulting in a 
rejection of access for the ordinary 
operators of the besieged system. The 
types of DDoS attacks are when an 
attack over encumbers the server by 
expending all the allotted bandwidth 
through a network-centric assault, and a 
program-based strike that overburdens 
a system by initiating applications. 
Insider Threat and Theft This is a malicious hacker who 
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can physically access the information 
systems of a business, institution, or 
agency. Insider threats are often 
disgruntled employees or ex-employees 
that are seeking revenge or financial 
gain. A recent example of this is the 
Edward Snowden NSA case. Snowden 
physically walked in with a flash drive, 
and walked out with classified 
information.  
Vulnerability exploit These also include zero-day 
exploits, and take advantage of security 
vulnerability as they are discovered. 
These include installing malware, 
spyware, or just allowing unwanted 
access to information. In the case of 
zero-day exploits, since the vulnerability 
is not known in advance, there is no 
way to guard against the exploitation 
before it happens. Zero-day 
vulnerabilities are the holy grail of 
modern hacking tools. 
 
 
Responses to Cyber-Attacks 
Defense was the predominant approach to internet security during the 
internet’s earliest days. The basic idea was to secure a network with systems 
that could prevent intrusion, such as firewalls, for example. These systems were 
created with the ability to keep logs of suspicious codes, as well as the ability to 
detect suspicious patterns. They would continually be updated so as to keep up 
with newly emerging threats. One related issue was that this system depended 
heavily on a user’s ability to personally update antivirus software. According to 
Tom Kellerman, vice-president of the U.S. security firm Trend Micro, “You keep 
the crown jewels on the inside, and you build electronic walls and a moat around 
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them.”81 This strategy only works well if the attacks are from small-scale hackers, 
whose attacks are scattered and random. These individuals are simply 
attempting to find an easy way in, and as they hit obstructions, they generally 
move on to the next target. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 6: Types of Cyber Crime Attacks in 2015. 82 
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Figure 7: Types of Attacks in December 2013.83 
However, in recent years these types of security systems are failing to 
stop the more aggressive actors who are making the most of the technological 
advancements of the modern era. There has been a rise in what is known as 
“targeted attacks,” where an attacker invades a specific organization, agency, or 
individual. These individuals or groups usually also have a specific goal or 
system in mind prior to the attack and are not randomly looking for vulnerabilities. 
No individual or network is completely safe from these hacks, as has been 
demonstrated on numerous occasions, and any given person can be the target of 
a hacker’s attack.  Any system can be tainted just by merely opening a 
communication or visiting the incorrect site. “Up until four years ago, we kind of 
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had a handle on this shit,” Tom Kellermann said in 2013. “Virus scanning and 
encryption and firewalls were doing a pretty good job. But the latest attack kits 
are bypassing those perimeter defenses, which is why this paradigm has to 
shift.”84 
  The eruption of hacking is a natural outcome of progress in the networking 
tools that has grown around the internet, as well as by the widespread operation 
of computers all around the globe. The online systems of the better part of 
contemporary are all in danger of being destroyed or pillaged from outside 
threats, and we are frequently reminded of this when news breaks of another 
high-profile hack or leak. One group alone from China, codenamed APT1 
(Advanced Persistent Threat 1), has methodically appropriated hundreds of 
terabytes of information from at least one hundred and forty one establishments, 
and have proven that they have the ability and goal of taking from a great amount 
of individuals and establishments instantaneously.85  
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Figure 8: Targeted Systems and Motivations in 2013.86 
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Figure 9: November 2013 Attacks. Distribution of targets, industries attacked, 
and types of organizations of November 201387   
 
Who Are These Hackers? 
  Hackers come from all walks of life and from just about every nationality, 
and the Chinese hacking community is little different in this respect. Active 
individually as well as in thousands of cyber groups, Chinese hackers represent 
a community of practitioners that have developed a maturity unmatched at such 
a large level. Other groups around the world might have more technological 
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knowledge of systems and tools, like the NSA, but Chinese hacking groups are 
far greater in number. So in reality, due to sheer numbers and the fact that many 
of these individuals are self-taught, the Chinese hacking community exists on a 
far grander level than other global hacking groups that are smaller coalitions. 
They have developed a similar knowledge base to other hackers around the 
world. Their communities contain many layers of different groups that range from 
black-hat hackers, malware tool developers, novices and expert computer 
system explorers, and legitimate legal security analysts and researchers. 
 There are many publications in China that glorify patriotic hackers. This 
recent trend helps show that hackers are experiencing a esteemed place in the 
internet culture in China, and perhaps in the wider society. Books about hackers 
like Cliff Stoll’s 1989 book, The Cuckoo’s Egg, are common, and are making 
Chinese citizens familiar with the same ideologies of the individuals who target 
political enemies around the world.88 In the face of the recent attempts by the 
Chinese government to crack down on hacking within the country, it still 
continues to be a growing business in China, and it is extending its reaches 
globally. Four significant search engines exist that allowed this community 
access to the tools and information that it needs: Baidu, Google China, Google 
US, and Yahoo! China. All four of these engines provide ample links to hacker 
sites, blogs, and forums with just a simple search of the common Chinese term 
for hackers, “黑客,” heike, which sounds something like “hacker” and ominously 
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translates as “black guest.”89 It is within sites where hackers can develop greater 
social circles in which information on certain networks and tools can be spread. 
New hackers can learn how, as well as what, is needed to hack based on 
information found on hacker sites, blogs, and forums. It is not uncommon for 
homegrown self-taught hackers to be created by these means.  
 Motivations behind hacking in China can be categorized in one of four 
ways: nationalism, technical interest, financial gain, and/or fame. For example, 
when political conflict and personal interest are no longer efficient motivations for 
hackers, money and fame become the primary motivations keeping Chinese 
hacking organizations from disbanding. In an interview that I performed with a 
former member of Anonymous Serbia, the motivation of fame was touched on. 
He mentioned about making connections with hackers that “once you are in the 
journalism field people start trusting you and that's how hackers, cyber criminals, 
and other actors share the inside stories of their work and hey, who don't like 
fame? So yeah, they love to get into the news and share their stories.”90 In an 
interview published by HackRead, the Chinese hacker who uses the name “7zi” 
explained his initiation into the hacking sphere and how motivations even for one 
individual are constantly changing. In what started as a fiscal venture with few 
restrictions, 7zi found that political motivations gradually became more and more 
important to him. “I did not work and because of shortage of funds, I began to 
visit hacker circles (online). A brother suggested that I undertake a number of 
underground transactions... But I hate to attack the government and education 
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network [sic], so I did not accept this type of business. I am a patriotic young 
person, and when the Philippines policeman hijacked the bus full of Chinese, I 
took part in the back [sic] on the president of the Philippines Department of 
Communications.”91 This individual’s story shows us how difficult it is to track the 
motivations of hackers in China. Not only is there a broad spectrum of 
motivations, but even one individual may fluctuate between different motivating 
forces depending on matters ranging from geopolitics to personal finance. 
  Many of these individuals also generate income by marketing the culture 
around them. Besides illegal monetary gains, hackers in China exist in a culture 
that loves and reveres them. Newspapers clamor to interview them, universities 
strive to create them, and books and other publications are written based on 
them. Some thrive openly in the public sector, and even publish their own hacker 
magazines and webpages. The Chinese hacking culture is nothing like anything 
found elsewhere around the globe. One example that reflects the popularity of 
hacking in China, is the Blue Lotus Capture the Flag Competition (CTF). One of 
the world’s largest hacking competitions, the Blue-Lotus competition is held in 
mainland China where competitors compete at solving individual hacking-based 
tasks. On April 26, 2015, Jiaotong University held its second annual CTF 
tournament titled 0CTF 2015, or the Information Security Technology Challenge. 
Over 654 hacking teams from all over the globe participated, including teams 
from Shanghai Jiaotong University, Tsinghua University, Fudan University, 
Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Wuhan University, Fuzhou 
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University, and top international hackers.92 
  Another term that revolves around Chinese hacking is hacktivism. The 
term defines an act of breaching a system based on political and/or social 
motivations. The individual who performs these acts use similar implements and 
methods as any other hacker. This kind of attacker may perhaps leave a 
noticeable comment or note with words or images that reflect a distinct point-of-
view on a webpage experiences a significant number of visitors. This type of 
attack is hidden at the very root of hacking culture in China. In April 2001, 
Chinese hacktivists posted political homages to Chinese pilot Lieutenant 
Commander Wang Wei on American sites linked to the government and military. 
These consisted of the site belonging to the United States Geological Survey 
administration, as well as an offshoot site of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, and the Naval Surface Force of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet 
webpage.93 Wang Wei was killed following a collision with a U.S. Naval 
surveillance plane over the South China Sea.94  
  Hacker culture in China was largely formed around these types of cultural 
and political events. One of the earliest, largest and most enduring active hacking 
groups in China was the Red Hacker Alliance. The alliance was a large coalition 
of smaller groups that banded together to voice their opinions on political events 
at the time. Prior to the group’s formation hackers worked individually or in very 
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small and close-knit groups. Take the more current examples of Edward 
Snowden and Anonymous for example. Both of these cases outline the 
individualism or closeness that hackers usually exhibit. Snowden was the sole 
contributor to the theft and leak of government information and Anonymous is a 
close-knit group of expert hackers whose reach spans the entire globe. 
  There are other worldwide incidents where political actions and cyber-
warfare combine much like the above 2001 case. The global hacking group 
Anonymous is perhaps the highest-profile entity in discussions of political 
hacking groups. Their actions, like the case of the Motion Picture Association of 
America and Recording Industry Association of America discussed earlier, are a 
staple of the hacking landscape. Another case that made the media rounds was 
that of Edward Snowden. The Snowden scandal began in June 2013 when the 
newspaper, The Guardian reported that the NSA (National Security Agency) was 
gathering information based on the phone records of millions of U.S. citizens. 
The organization monitored the systems and records of nine internet major 
companies to trace cyber communications in a program named PRISM (Planning 
Tool for Resource Integration, Synchronization, and Management).95 The NSA 
released a statement, right after the first news stories, calling PRISM “the most 
significant tool in the NSA’s arsenal for the detection, identification, and 
disruption of terrorist threats to the US and around the world.”96 Since its 
creation, the NSA has become one of the strongest cyber groups in the world, 
with cyber-capabilities that far out-strip entire nations. 
                                                          
95 Kaplan, Fred M. Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War. (2016) P. 228-229, 247 
96 Ibid, 247 
 71 
 
  The Chinese government and the PLA has developed systems much like 
the NSA in an attempt to match the cyber-capabilities of other leading nations 
like the U.S., Russia, and Iran. This is evident in the PLA’s creation of the Third 
General Staff Department for Signals Intelligence. Similar to the NSA in that it is 
a government created group dedicated to and specialized information warfare 
militia units. In May 2011, the country proclaimed that it had created a “Blue 
Army” cyber command division of individuals who were recruited from the armed 
forces, universities, and experts from security organizations.97 
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CHAPTER THREE:  
THE EVOLUTION OF CHINESE HACKERS 
Even though the internet was established in China in 1994, there were 
only seven rudimentary hacker webpages three years later in 1997. The pages 
available to Chinese individuals were usually reprints and copied information 
from foreign sites. Most Chinese hackers at the time were very simple in their 
methodology, and used email-based attacks that were supplied in prepackaged 
toolkits. Needless to say, the hacker culture was nothing like what exists today. 
The complexities of modern global or national attacks did not exist.98  
  There would, however, be a significant explosion in hacking activity in 
1999, centered around the Indonesian riots of 1998 that came after a financial 
calamity and saw Chinese individuals in Jakarta targeted by mob violence. A 
significant amount of the Indonesian populace discriminatorily held responsible 
the Indonesian Sino-community for the rampant inflation that was occurring 
within the country, leading to Indonesian civilians targeting their Chinese 
counterparts with violence, rape, and sometimes murder. This would mark a two-
fold evolution that would forever change the Chinese hacking landscape forever. 
The first change was from simplistic tampering to malicious attackers. The 
second was in the scope and complexity of the attacks as these groups moved 
into the twenty-first century. The overall change between the two can be seen as 
hacker groups moved away from actions like defacing foreign governmental 
websites to the simultaneous multi-national cyber-attacks that have become 
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common in the last few years. In recent years, it has consistently been the latter 
forms of attacks causing significant damage to global infrastructures and 
becoming a hot-button issue for political discussion. 
Before the Indonesia riots, few significant hacking organizations existed. 
Nothing close to an alliance or a group of hackers existed in the years 1995 and 
1996. There is nothing at the time that suggests that forms of communication 
other than rare chat room discussions were taking place between hackers. 
During this time, Gao Chunhui’s webpage was the only forum in China dedicated 
to anything resembling to hacking as we understand it today, and even Gao’s 
page contained subject matter mainly pertaining to cracking software code. 
In 1997, the largest organized hacking group at the time went by the name 
the Green Army, alternatively known by the name Whampoa (Huangpu) 
Academy. Both names are historical references, the first to a Qing dynasty 
(1644-1911) military force, and the second to a famous military academy of the 
1920s run by the Nationalist government, but where both Nationalist and 
Communist future military leaders were first trained. This group is reported to 
have had a membership of approximately 3000 at its height. Operating in 
Shanghai, Beijing, and Shijazhuang, the group was established by a cyber expert 
that went by the pseudonym “Goodwill.” The group also drew in further 
individuals and together they encompassed was is now deemed the country’s 
first group of hackers, such as Cheng Weishan, Peng Quan, Xie Zhaoxia, Huang 
Lei, and “Little Rong.”99 In 2000. the collection dispersed and is now commonly 
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known as a great example of the lasting representations of the Chinese hacker 
culture.100 The groups was also one of the first to make successful commercial 
ventures as well through its Beijing Green Alliance offshoot, which would lead to 
its collapse. The collective of hackers would invariably split in to two groups, with 
that former moving into the business of more legalized operations, and the latter 
(Beijing Green Alliance) continuing the group’s illegal hacking efforts. A legal 
battle insued between the two groups in 2000 leading to a ruling in favor of the 
Beijing Green Alliance, in which they were granted financial restitution as well as 
control of the  group’s web domain (isbase.com). 
 
1998- The Birth of Chinese Hacking 
  The year of 1998 is considered by most scholars to be the true birth of 
Chinese hacking. There were two incidents that combined to become the catalyst 
that produced China’s unique hacker culture. The first incident happened outside 
of China with the release of the “Back Orifice Program” by the American hacking 
group, “Cult of the Dead Cow.”101 After the program was released, Chinese 
hackers gained access to its valuable source code and it became a new tool in 
their repertoire. This program was responsible for the increased use of the now-
common Trojan horse virus, which is characterized by its concealment within 
another program and its malevolent/destructive nature.  
  The second part of this two-pronged catalyst came with the Indonesian 
riots of 1998 and subsequent cyber-conflicts. With the exception of the Green 
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Army, large unified hacker groups did not exist in China as they do now. 
Tentative communications were developing within the nascent community, and 
coalitions were starting to form (like the Green Army), but there was not a binding 
ideology in place to bring these new hackers together. This would all change with 
the incidents in Jakarta, Indonesia. In May 1998, riots swept through Jakarta 
after a financial crisis devastated the country. Inquiries by human rights 
organizations revealed that many of the targets of the hostility were from 
Jakarta’s Chinese community. It was a methodical process of discrimination that 
included the armed forces and law enforcement.102 Some ethnic Chinese 
communities were victimized in a number of atrocities, including rapes, murders, 
and the destruction of Chinese property and businesses.103  
Stories from Indonesia reached Chinese cyberspace, and spread like 
wildfire in online communities. The shock brought on by the violence was quickly 
replaced by outrage.104 The individual hackers and budding hacker groups that 
commonly patrolled online communities had found their common cause. A 
spontaneous gathering of hackers took place in what are known as IRC (Internet 
Relay Chat) chat rooms.105 Together, the first Chinese hacktivist groups were 
formed. In political retaliation, these groups worked together to attack the 
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Indonesian government’s website by bombarding their e-mail system. It was a 
primitive attack in comparison to attacks a decade later, but it was the first 
collective demonstration of cyber-force that Chinese hackers showed, and it was 
a crucial moment in the development of China’s hacker community as it exists 
today. 
 On August 7, 1998, what had originally started as e-mail-based attacks 
escalated into website defacement. Chinese hackers obtained access to several 
web pages from Indonesia, and to show the strength of their attack, the hackers 
attached the addresses of other defaced web sites.106 The online publication 
China Byte broke the news of the attacks to individuals with e-mail subscriptions, 
and soon after, news of the cyber-attacks spread. The email published the same 
message that the hackers published on the page: “Your site has been hacked by 
a group of hackers from China. Indonesian thugs, there can be retribution for 
your atrocities, stop slaughtering the Chinese people [sic].”107 As the attacks 
continued, other sites were vandalized with other political statements. One of 
these statements, on the homepage of the Indonesian National Family Planning 
Coordinating Board, was supplanted with a statement exclaiming “Warning from 
Chinese. This page is hacked for your national day. Please keep this page for 48 
hours and punish the murderers in May immediately [sic].”108  
 The Indonesian riots also give birth to what would become the “Red 
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Hacker Alliance”, one of the most significant cyber-groups in the internet’s short 
history. The political nature of this patriotic campaign led to the creation of 
something entirely new, and would be the first time the term “red hacker” (红客
hongke) would be used. The attacks in the country functioned as the facilitator 
that brought together individuals who normally operated independently under the 
guise of nationalism, establishing not only a group but also the notion of red 
hackers which still exists today.109 As a present affiliate of the Red Hacker 
Alliance known as “Sharp Winner” states, it exists as “a group of patriotic youth 
active on the net engaged in attacks on Indonesian government web sites, under 
the alias ‘China Red hackers.’ This patriotic action received a great deal of 
reporting and praise in the domestic and overseas media. The name China red 
hackers began here.”110  
  A year later, in July of 1999, Chinese hackers would once again have 
political motivations to perform collective actions. This was the first such event 
since the attacks on Indonesia. These attacks centered on Taiwanese President 
Lee Teng-hui’s (Li Denghui) “Two-States Theory,” which advocated the idea that 
it was an independent country. This perceived threat to the One China Policy and 
the nation’s sovereignty sparked political attacks by Chinese hackers on 
Taiwanese targets. On August 7, 1999, hackers attacked ten Taiwanese 
government pages, leaving statements like “There is only one China in the world 
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and the world only needs one China.”111 The same Chinese hackers went on to 
sabotage state, college, and industrial webpages. The assaults allegedly 
included more than one hundred and sixty penetrations of the nationwide 
computer systems of Taiwan.112  
 This event would become what is now known as the First Taiwan-China 
Hacker War. It played a crucial role in how Chinese hackers would engage in 
future attacks. This is the point when the first malicious attacks by Chinese 
hackers took place. Before 1999, hackers merely e-mail bombed, performed 
denial-of-service attacks, or left political messages on websites. It was during this 
war that two different malicious programs were developed and used that would 
change the Chinese cyber-landscape forever.  
 
Tools of the Trade 
  It would mark the beginning of a new era where programs were created in 
China instead of being brought in from elsewhere. The first program created in 
this way was the Glacier Trojan Horse virus, by security programmer Huang Xin. 
The Trojan horse virus Netspy (inspired by the above-mentioned Cult of the 
Dead Cow’s Back Orifice) followed Glacier, and both would become a hacker 
staple for years to come. Other hacking tools created in this period included 
Black Hole, Network Thief, XSan and YAI. Glacier, Black Hole, and Network 
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Thief are still essential tools for hackers in China, and offshoot versions of each 
have been developed.113 These new programs do indeed mark a shift in the 
Chinese hacking landscape, and as hackers deployed the newly developed 
“Glacier” and “NetSpy” for the first time they invariably moved away from minor 
intrusions and into a realm of maliciousness. 
 In Chu Tianbi’s writing Chinese Hacker History/Looking Back on Chinese 
Hacker History, he adds that the Taiwan-China Hacker War led to the formation 
of hacker classifications (red hackers, blue hackers, and black hackers).  
In addition, it was also in this year that the entirely new concept of ‘Blue 
Hackers’ arose. During this time, Chinese hackers could essentially be 
divided into three categories. One was hackers with a political and 
nationalistic bent represented by the Chinese Red Hackers. Another was 
the technical hackers purely interested in Internet security technology and 
not concerned with other issues, represented by the Blue Hackers. The 
last type was the original ‘Black’ Hackers who were entirely concerned 
with pursuit of the original hacker spirit and did not focus on politics or the 
frenzied pursuit of technology.114  
These hacker classifications do not follow the normal categorization of 
traditional hacker cultures noted above (black, white, and grey hat hackers), but 
is the best description of Chinese hacker culture due to the deep patriotic and 
nationalistic beliefs that fueled hackers in China for many years. Even today, 
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hacker culture is routinely fueled by political events, although these initial groups 
have largely moved into the “blue hacker” category. 
 The Chinese hacker community continued to make huge strides after the 
cyber-feud with Taiwan. Less than a year later, another incident sparked the 
same nationalistic fervor. On May 7, 1999, the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia 
was bombarded by U.S.-led forces during the Kosovo War. The bombing was 
declared to be a tragic accident by the Americans, and blamed on using old 
maps of the city of Belgrade. The incident resulted in the deaths of three 
Chinese. According to Tianbi, “the second day after the bombing of the Chinese 
embassy, the first Chinese Red Hacker web site appeared, and a new type of 
hacker was born – the Red Hacker.”115 This attack in consort with the assaults on 
Taiwan in 1998 aided in solidifying the international position of Chinese hackers 
as a collective, prepared to partake in politically driven denial-of-service attacks, 
data destruction, and website defacement. Yet, it was not until 1998-1999 that 
these individuals banded together in groups like the “Red Hacker Alliance.” The 
group exchanged vandalism and DDoS strikes with their enemies in Taiwan, the 
United States, Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea and functioned with freedom 
until disapprovals delivered from the Chinese government and the threat of 
prosecution basically ended the attacks.116  
As the world readied for the twenty-first century, so did this ever-growing 
hacker culture. Between 2000 and 2005, Chinese hackers increased their 
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dominance in the Asian world with continued attacks on Japan and Taiwan. The 
majority of attacks stemmed from political motivations, and the number of hacker 
groups increased as existing hacker groups grew in size.  
 
Table 2- Chronological Timeline of Significant Hacker Attacks from China. 
Year Name of Attack Cause 
1998 Indonesian Riots Chinese hackers assault webpages in 
reaction to anti-Chinese 
d.emonstrations in Indonesia 
1999 Taiwan’s “Two- 
States” 
Raids are initiated in opposition to 
Taiwanese webpages after the 
country’s leader asserts that the 
country is independent. 
1999 Chinese 
Embassy 
Bombing 
Strikes against the United States’ sites 
commence after the Chinese Embassy 
is bombarded by U.S. forces. 
2000 Nanjing 
Massacre 
Incident 
Japanese webpages are hit after the 
Japanese administration is alleged to 
refute its accountability in the Nanjing 
Massacre. 
2000 Taiwan Voting 
Episode 
Hackers assault webpages after Chen 
Shui-bian is voted as leader.  
2001 Assault on Japan 
II 
Chinese groups attack Japanese 
webpages for improper treatment of 
Chinese citizens on an airline, poorly 
manufactured cars from Japanese 
company Mitsubishi, and Japanese 
textbooks. 
2001 Sino-U.S. Hacker 
War 
Chinese and American hackers attack 
one another after an American spy 
plane crashes into a Chinese fighter 
jet, forcing the U.S. pilot to land on 
Hainan. 
2004 Diaoyu Island 
Dispute 
 Individuals assault Japanese 
webpages in retaliation to Japanese 
hacker attacks. 
2005 Yasukuni War 
Memorial 
Incident 
Webpages are vandalizes by Chinese 
hackers when Japan’s Prime Minister 
journeys to the Yasukuni War 
Memorial 
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Hacker War: US-China 
  Even to this day Chinese hackers have had a fondness for American 
systems. If the Chinese embassy bombing planted the seeds of anti-American 
actions, then the events in 2001 would be the sprouting of the tree. Hackers from 
the U.S. and China conducted mass confrontations; much like the one fought 
with the Taiwanese after a U.S. spy aircraft crashed into a Chinese military 
aircraft and then made an emergency landing on the island of Hainan, which is 
Chinese territory. The crew was detained for several days and then released. 
These Sino-American attacks continued to escalate beyond the 2001 
incidents. In 2003, hackers from China were able to steal information from 
various U.S. government agencies. The group conducted wide-ranging assaults 
in attempts to appropriate delicate intelligence as part of has now been 
codenamed “Titan Rain.” The sheer scale, speed, and range was remarkable. On 
November 1st, 2004, at 10:23 p.m. the attackers assaulted the U.S. Army 
Information Systems Engineering Command in Arizona. Less than an hour later, 
they used an identical weakness to attack the Defense Information Systems 
Agency in Virginia. Five hours after the initial attack, the hackers struck again at 
California’s Naval Ocean Systems Center. The last attack occurred just before 5 
a.m. with the United States Army Space and Strategic Defense system.117 
According to Alan Paller, the director of the SANS Institute which specializes in 
information security and cybersecurity training, “From the Redstone Arsenal, 
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home to the Army Aviation and Missile Command, the attackers grabbed specs 
for the aviation mission-planning system for Army helicopters, as well as 
Falconview 3.2, the flight-planning software used by the Army and Air Force.”118 
What makes these attacks more significant than previous ones is that military 
systems are not connected to the internet directly, so these hackers needed to 
bypass levels of security that far exceeds the previous actions of Chinese hacker 
groups. Some of the other attacks on American systems include United Airlines, 
United States Steel, and more famously, Westinghouse. Chinese targets 
extended among every significant industry by 2012, when the director of the NSA 
Keith Alexander designated cyber-espionage out of China as the “greatest 
transfer of wealth in history.”119 
It is clear from the foundations of the Chinese hacking community, as laid 
out above, that it did not begin with strict governmental initiatives, but rather from 
the spontaneous actions of an outraged citizenry, or “netizenry.” A coincidence of 
events in the mid and late 1990s brought about an increasingly coherent 
community of Chinese hackers with a clear theme of patriotism and nationalism 
driving much of the community’s activity. While today it is very difficult to discern 
the sources and motives for all Chinese hacks, these early foundations show that 
Chinese hacking did not begin as the product of explicit governmental directives. 
Rather, early Chinese “hacktivism” began in the grey area of spontaneous 
                                                          
118 Espiner, Tom. “Security experts lift lid on Chinese hack attacks”, November 23, 2005. 
Accessed December 13, 2015. http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1009_22-145763.html  
119 Rogin, Josh. "NSA Chief: Cybercrime Constitutes the greatest transfer of wealth in history." 
Foreign Policy. July 9, 2012.  Accessed February 21, 2016. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/07/09/nsa-chief-cybercrime-constitutes-the-greatest-transfer-of-
wealth-in-history/ 
 84 
 
nationalist activity in defense of China’s international prestige as conceived by 
China’s hackers. 
  However, the creation of Chinese hacking groups helps to convolute the 
perception of the Chinese hacking landscape. While the foundations and growth 
of these groups is indebted to political activism and an independent nature, the 
rise of China’s economic progress during this era owes a great deal to state-
sponsored cyber-espionage. Due to a clash of these two ideologies, it can be 
sometimes difficult to distinguish amongst the two. The question that the next few 
chapters attempts to answer is just that, how can someone distinguish from what 
is nationalistic independent action and what are state-sponsored cyber-attacks? 
 Hacker culture itself seems to be a mirror of the political system that has 
made China into such a strong economic world power in the realm of 
manufacturing. Much like a manufacturing system, an individual could write a 
low-level computer code that is given to or sold to other individuals above them. 
These secondary individuals might be contracted using these codes or may sell 
them. These codes could even be placed on hacker webpages where individual 
can download them or buy them for their own purposes.120 Because of this it is 
sometimes very difficult to distinguish between who created the means of attack, 
and who committed it. The attack might be traced back to the creator, who could 
very well have no ties to the government, yet the perpetrator of the attack could 
very well be a state-run organization. This very issue came up during my 
discussion with the founder of HackRead. This notion also pertains to the idea 
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that the attack is carried out by one individual and the information stolen is sold 
to other and reduces the accuracy of recognizing the target. He states “The 
Independent Chinese and Russian hackers are also sophisticated as they target 
governments to steal documents and sell them to the government-backed 
hackers (call them freelancers). I personally think that governments have no 
problem with independent hackers and they actually like what these guys do, 
there's always something important coming from these independent groups.”121 
Later on in the same interview, he said “And like I said Chinese hackers don't 
fear the government because the government knows one day they will get 
something sensitive from these independent hackers.”122 This is very important in 
understanding the way that attacks are carried out, because rarely are the means 
of attack created by the attackers themselves. More commonly, a program or 
virus is created by one individual or a small group and acquired by a larger 
organization. 
  In the subsequent chapters, the different categorizations of Chinese 
hackers will be outlined in one of three ways: independent, state-sponsored, and 
freelance. It has become exceedingly difficult for experts and researchers to 
separate the different groups because of the intricacies of the hacking culture as 
well as the anonymity of the internet. There are significant differences between 
the three classes, and therefore, it is possible to provide a view into the Chinese 
hacking underworld.
                                                          
121 Waqas, Amir. "Chinese Hackers." E-mail interview by author. April 7, 2016. 
122 Ibid 
 86 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: 
INDEPENDENT ACTORS 
In China, there is some blurring of the line between patriotic hackers and 
criminal hackers. There is also often uncertainty about whether a cyber-attack 
has been launched by a military or government employee sitting at an office 
desk, or by sympathetic unaffiliated civilians, or contracted civilians, or even by 
independent civilians who are attacking for personal motivations such as financial 
gain or notoriety. Due to the fact that the PRC has its hand in many aspects of 
the economy entails that hackers have a tendency to come across government 
jobs in their search for work. “I don’t think the West understands,” a former 
Chinese hacker said. “China’s government is so big. It’s almost impossible to not 
have any crossover with the government.”123 This striking statement is a good 
point of departure for our examination of the different types of Chinese hackers, 
starting with independent actors. 
 Independent hackers are more often than not motivated by money or 
nationalism, but see themselves as lone sharks in a sea of government-
orchestrated agendas. The difference in China is that these individuals for the 
most part have in mind what is best for their understanding of the Chinese 
national good, which might involve direct support for the government, or a 
broader understanding of Chinese national interest. Most often when Chinese 
hackers are reported on in the world news, they may be an unit in the PLA or a 
member of an independent nationalistic hacker group. Distinct from the hackers 
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in the West, who typically are solitary or activists, individuals from China are 
more concerned about political affairs and establishing the country as superior on 
a global stage. 
  Independent, non-state sponsored hackers have deep roots in patriotism 
and nationalism. These groups date back to the beginning of hacking in China, 
with groups like ChinaWill, the Red Hacker Alliance, and the Green Army. There 
is a strong relationship between these types of groups and Chinese identity and 
Chinese culture and the country’s place in the world. According to journalist, 
Edward Wong writing in the New York Times states that “the culture of hacking in 
China is not confined to top-secret military compounds where hackers carry out 
orders to pilfer data from foreign governments and corporations.” Furthermore, 
hacking is a fixture of society that is blatantly deliberated about “at trade shows, 
inside university classrooms and on internet forums.”124  
 
Honker Union (1999/2001–Present) 
  Today, China’s most famous group of hackers, the Honker Union, 
illustrates the grey area separating nationalistic actors and the state. The word 
Honker is similar in nature to the term hongke, which literally means ‘red visitor’.  
Founded in 2001, the group grew out of the cyber-warfare centered around the 
Hainan spy plane incident of that year. Although some scholarship on the subject 
has asserted that there is a link between the Honker Union and the Chinese 
government, no specific details have been published. It is true that the hacking 
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group’s actions are similar to the Party’s agenda, but in my assessment, this is 
not enough to categorize a group as state-sponsored. Many patriotic hackers 
perform actions that follow the same goals as the Communist Party. One of 
Honker Union’s leaders, Lyon, has gone on the record saying, “The Honker 
Union ... has no interest in getting involved in politics. We work only for the 
security of Chinese websites.”125 Yet the same article concludes by stating that 
Lyon is the head of a department in a major state-owned telecommunications 
firm. The Honker Union has an established set of rules of engagement. To further 
illustrate the way that the Honker Union operates and how their actions could 
follow the same ideologies of the Party all one has to do it look at these rules of 
engagement, which are found on their webpage and state the following: 
 1. Our offensive and defensive skills are not used to show off! 
 2. Out technology is to share with all patriotic Honkers! 
  3. We will continue to learn, and continually research new techniques of    
  attacks and defenses! 
  4. We must familiar [ourselves] with the C language, and any other  
      language of the target! 
  5. We must be patriotic! 
  6. We not only need to know the common exploits of the systems, but also  
       need to know how to discover exploits! 
  7. We must know how to use search engine, it is a very good tool for  
      learning! 
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  8. We must know how to break the conventional way of thinking! “Nothing  
      is impossible, if we can think of, then we can do it! There is no “room”  
      we cannot enter, if the “room” allows air to go in then we can become  
      “air” and go into the room! 
  9. We must know how to conduct oneself! – learning skills must first learn  
      how to conduct oneself!126 
  After the May 1999 event that say the embassy bombed in Yugoslavia, the 
word “Honker” emerged within the hacking community. Since then, the 
individuals whom this term illustrates have bended together within a collective 
known as the Honker Union. These individuals unite their computer expertise 
with nationalism. At the group’s inception, a series of attacks on websites in the 
United States was initiated that illustrate this blending of skills and ideologies. At 
the time of writing, there is no evidence that the Chinese government has any 
affiliation with the group. The group mainly teaches and exchanges in 
counterattack skills, and includes around fifty thousand members. 
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Figure 10: Honker Union Attacks on Iranian Sites. A Honker Union attack on 
Iranian web sites due to political motivations in 2010, and on an American web 
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site.127  
  The New York Times indicates that hacking can also be a profitable 
vocation in China, even if the individual does not work for the government. An 
individual who has enough technological knowledge can utilize his or her abilities 
to make one hundred thousand dollars per year in U.S. currency. Along with this, 
it is the open culture and the view of hackers in China that contribute to such an 
incredible phenomenon. Young individuals and students in China adore hackers. 
They want to be them. In a study directed by the Shanghai Academy of Social 
Sciences,  of the five thousand primary school students who were interviewed 43 
percent answered that they “adored” hackers and 33 percent said they fantasized 
of growing to be one in the future.128 Hacking in China is a lifestyle, an aspiration, 
and a culture. It presents an autonomous avenue for the possibility of an 
existence of their own desire, and not one that is controlled or regulated by the 
government, family expectations, or cultural tradition. In response to the survey, 
one student named Fan Yi said, “Hackers are very cool. Hackers leave people an 
impression of high intelligence and are able to do whatever they like and get 
whatever secrets they want. That is what I lack but dream of.”129 
  It is this view of hacker culture and the vast numbers who aspire to the 
lifestyle and vocation of hacking that creates such a grey area where individuals 
cannot be easily categorized. In the view of wishful individuals who aspire to 
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become hackers, those who already are hackers seem to be able to do whatever 
they want. They are a beacon of freedom and autonomy. 
  In 2008, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 
organized an investigation into cyber threats originating from China. The 
organization collected a wide range of security experts. The Commission’s report 
established that “determining the origin of cyber operations, and attributing them 
to the Chinese government or any other operator, is difficult. Computer network 
operations provide a high degree of plausible deniability” to the Chinese 
government.130 
  Online, an enthusiastic student can purchase all the tools of the trade, 
from pre-programed Trojan horses to explanations of how to avoid or bypass 
anti-virus programs. The market for malware in China includes many different 
types of software, like the program Grey Pigeon. Grey Pigeon was initially 
conceived to remotely control another user’s computer, and provided hackers 
with an ideal tool. With this tool at their disposal, hackers are quickly able to 
exploit any opening or system vulnerability. “Malware groups out of China have 
been very quick to adopt zero-day exploits,” said Nart Villeneuve, chief research 
officer at SecDev.Cyber. “They may be operating independently but there may be 
some sort of market for selling the information that they get.”131 These zero-day 
vulnerabilities are system weaknesses that exist without knowledge prior to an 
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incident; because the group that created it was not aware it existed. In 2008, 
James Mulvenon, a prominent cyber-security expert, informed a congressional 
commission that there are some individuals who receive instruction at institutions 
specifically to become hackers or to learn to acquire confidential information 
through computer activities, like the Communication Command Academy in 
Wuhan for example.132 
 
Red Hacker Alliance (1998-Present) 
  In 1998, individual hackers merged into what is known today as the Red 
Hacker Alliance. This group still exists and has been a strong foundation for 
Chinese hacking culture for almost twenty years at the time of writing. In 1999, 
the bombardment of the United States Embassy in Yugoslavia brought together a 
collection of nationalistic individuals in an attempt to defend their country against 
what they saw as imperialism. Many of these individuals took the fight to 
cyberspace in hacking efforts. These ‘red hackers’, as they were dubbed, 
attacked any individual or group that they saw as critical of China, and infiltrated 
other governments, organizations, and companies.  
  Following the wave of cyber-attacks related to the embassy bombing, the 
group participated in a sequence of other assaults in opposition to specific 
countries. They struck Taiwan in 1999 and yet again in 2000, the latter being in 
connection to political elections. They also struck Japan in 2000 for events 
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regarding the Nanjing Massacre in the Second World War. They assaulted the 
country yet again in 2004, with strikes associated with the disagreements 
regarding the Diaoyu Islands. When the U.S.-Sino hacking war broke out in 
2001, the ‘Red Hackers’ sported approximately fifty thousand members. This 
number can be a little inflated, because there is no telling the levels of expertise 
that the majority of these members had. Many of these individuals knew little 
about computer systems and only join based on patriotism and because group 
membership does not require any technological knowledge. The group 
maintained that their actions were only in and their only intention was to “defend 
the national interests.”133 On the “Chinese hacker emergency meeting center” 
webpage that was created in the midst of an attack, it was declared, “We firmly 
support the position of the Chinese government and Communist Party of 
China.”134 
 
China Eagle and Wan Tao (2000-Dissolved) 
  The hacking group called China Eagle Union was founded in 2000. Over 
the course of their short history they penetrated a vast amount of systems 
ranging from American Government systems to Japanese personal 
communication systems. Their actions consequently followed the PRC agenda, if 
in a more aggressive and offensive manifestation than Beijing’s more diplomatic 
language and cautious action. This group comprises of thousands of hackers 
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whose declared objective is to penetrate western systems.135  Yet, founder Wan 
Tao stresses that he on no occasion hacked legitimately for the government and 
never stole confidential information. Other individuals affiliated with the group 
maintain that the government has no contribution in their undertakings, and that 
they are even defying the laws of the state which place them in jeopardy of 
incarceration.136  
  Today, a lot of these individuals are instead searching for the prospect of 
developing lawful security companies, or working legally within the security field. 
Tao has been a fundamental role in this idea of hackers discovering legal means 
for their skills in transforming the China Eagle Union into a NGO named the 
Intelligence Defense Friends Laboratory. This organization was formed with the 
intention to encourage more positive behavior for individuals who usually work 
illegally for a living. In 2012, Tao also functioned as a managing consultant on 
IBM's Cloud Tiger Team that markets IBM's cloud-based amenities. He stated 
that the Chinese hacking population is not one of a well-oiled machine in which 
gifted individuals are taken by the authorities and quickly incorporated into 
malevolent operations. Quite the reverse, the community exists as a collection of 
semi-skilled, self-taught individuals who are sometimes driven by nationalistic 
spirits. Their intention is to create disorder in the form of cyber activism, while 
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some merely seek to gain from their expertise.137 
 
Javaphile and Coolswallow (2000-2008) 
  Javaphile was created in September 2000 by two individuals with the 
online designations of “Coolswallow” and “blhuang”.138 The entire group is 
thought to be students enrolled at Jiaotong University in Shanghai. Coolswallow 
gained prominence during the 2001 EP-3 incident. Coolswallow and blhuang 
would later reorganize the group into a full-fledged hacker group as well as a 
creating a web site offering their services. The group gained some notoriety in 
2002 for vandalizing a Taiwanese company’s webpage, Lite-On.  
   Although its more significant members are also members of the Red 
Hacker Alliance, there is a noteworthy difference between the two groups. Site 
defacement is very common between the two groups. This can be seen in the 
attacks on the websites Lite-On and Fox T.V., as the graphics and language is 
not typical when compared to that of a Red Hacker Alliance attack. The group 
appears to be more religious-based than that of the common Chinese hacking 
groups as their homepage displays an image of a Buddha head. Coolswallow 
came out in the open under his own name in 2008 after publishing several 
academic articles on cyber-espionage. Peng Yinan, also known as Coolswallow, 
presently is performing research for the Chinese government. Since his work as 
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Coolswallow, Peng has worked as a security information consultant for the 
Shanghai Public Security Bureau, which highlights the relationship that some 
hackers have in state-run organizations.  Public Security Bureaus in the nation 
are similar to police agencies and act as the principle police and security 
authority for the People’s Republic of China. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Message From Javaphile After Taiwan Attack. A message left by the 
group Javaphile after an attack on the nation-state of Taiwan.140 
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Network Crack Program Hacker (NCPH) and Wicked Rose 
  The Network Crack Program Hacker (NCPH) group is culpable for the 
creation and distribution of vulnerabilities in Microsoft Word and Microsoft Excel’s 
structure code. NCPH consists of approximately ten members, including 
individuals with the usernames “Wicked Rose,” “KuNgBiM,” “Rodag,” and 
“Charles.”141 Attacks by the group were first published on May 18, 2006. The 
group became well regarded due to their use of zero-day vulnerabilities. The first 
sign was discovered when the Internet Storm Center reported a potential zero-
day attack on May 18, 2006. The attacks started six days prior on May 12 and 
were discovered to be attacks on establishments in the U.S. and in Japan, two 
common cyber-enemies of Chinese hackers. 
  Wicked Rose is the most significant among the group’s members, as well 
as the one who is most public. An early twenty-year old college student studying 
at Sichuan University of Science and Engineering, it is through Wicked Rose that 
the other members can be ascertained.142 The group is more than likely other 
students at the university who form a close social circle and support each other’s 
hacking interests. Throughout the summer of 2006, while the school was not in 
active session, over thirty five zero-day vulnerabilities and assaults on previously 
undiscovered Microsoft Office vulnerabilities were exposed.143  
  Wicked Rose turned out to be an individual by the name of Tan Dailin. He 
was arrested by local authorities in Chengdu, China in 2009 due to new Chinese 
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cybercrime laws that were passed that same year. Tan was allegedly detailed 
after a discovered DDOS attack in which his victims went to the authorities with 
proof of his actions.144 There are significant dangers in hacking independently, 
especially now that cyber-attacks originating from Asia are gaining and 
international audience. China itself has passed legislation protecting public 
systems, which is a contrast to past legislation that merely protected government 
systems. In 2011, the PRC revised its Regulations on the Protection of Computer 
Information System Security of the PRC, and in 2012 the Decision of the National 
People’s Congress Standing Committee on Strengthening the Protection of 
Internet Information was passed.145 Both of these allowed for the crack down on 
cyber-attacks within the country. Individuals like Tan would find that the watchful 
eyes of the Chinese government would no longer turn a blind eye to the actions 
of hackers and hacktivists. Hackers would now face harsher punishment for their 
actions, especially if Chinese systems were the victims. 
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Figure 12: Wicked Rose, Leader of NCPH.  Wicked Rose turned out to be a 
college student named Tan Dailin.146 
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Figure 13: The Hacker Studio. Members of NCPH operating in their “Hacker 
studio”. 147  
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
STATE-SPONSORED GROUPS 
 Efforts by individuals or groups from China to pilfer vital information from 
western organizations and businesses have been well- documented. These 
successful or foiled attacks have caused frequent hostilities amongst the United 
States and China in recent years. Cyber-security authorities and prominent 
organizations whose services exist online, like Google and Microsoft, have 
upheld that Chinese individuals employ cyber-attacks to take vital information 
from many significant sectors of society. In the face of these accusations, 
Chinese representatives have routinely rejected assertions that the PRC and 
PLA are sponsors to cyber-attacks on western establishments. Representatives 
also reject the allegations that the PLA has the competency and abilities to 
assault the infrastructure and systems of other nations. In a proclamation in 
2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated, “the Chinese government does not 
engage in theft of commercial secrets in any form, nor does it encourage or 
support Chinese companies to engage in such practices in any way.” He also 
asserted, “Cybertheft of commercial secrets and hacking attacks against 
government networks are both illegal; such acts are criminal offenses and should 
be punished according to law and relevant international conventions.”148 There 
are specific laws created by the PRC to battle cybercrime in the nation: 
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Table 3: Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China 
Article Number Definition149 
285 Whoever violates state regulations and intrudes into 
computer systems within formation concerning state affairs, 
construction of defense facilities, and sophisticated science 
and technology is be sentenced to not more than three years 
of fixed-term imprisonment or criminal detention. 
286 Whoever violates states regulations and deletes, alters, 
adds, and interferes in computer information systems, 
causing abnormal operations of the systems and grave 
consequences, is to be sentenced to not more than five 
years of fixed-term imprisonment or criminal detention; when 
the consequences are particularly serious, the sentence is to 
be not less than five years of fixed-term imprisonment. 
Whoever violates state regulations and deletes, alters, or 
adds the data or application programs installed in or 
processed and transmitted by the computer systems, and 
causes grave consequences, is to be punished according to 
the preceding paragraph. 
Whoever deliberately creates and propagates computer 
virus and other programs which sabotage the normal 
operation of the computer system and cause grave 
consequences is to be punished according to the first 
paragraph. 
287 Whoever uses a computer for financial fraud, theft, 
corruption, misappropriation of public funds, stealing state 
secrets, or other crimes is to be convicted and punished 
according to relevant regulations of this law. 
 
  
 However, there are hacker collections that exhibit connections to the PRC  
and/or government-run organizations, and individuals from China’s hacking 
underworld have publically affirmed that they or a group that they were members 
of are now or at one point were sponsored by the state. United States security 
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firms have also published research on hacking groups that that link them to the 
Chinese government, like Mandiant and FireEye for example.150 On top of all 
this, there also exists official government documents issued by the Chinese 
government that confirms that the People’s Liberation Army has cyber-defense 
and warfare divisions.  
 While many media sources, like the Washington Times, continuously 
accuse the Chinese Communist Party for the bulk of attacks emanating from 
Asia, the party adamantly renounces these assertions. For example, hundreds of 
executive officers in Great Britain received messages from the chief of the British 
Secret Service informing them that they had fallen victim to cyber-attacks from 
the Chinese government.151 Party representatives allege that these assailants 
are either other governments feigning to be China, non-governmental sanctioned 
hackers, or the attacks themselves are fabrications created by anti-Chinese 
factions in the United States and Western Europe.  
 
The Science of Military Strategy and the Role of the Party 
There has been acknowledgement from the Chinese government itself 
that it has been developing and plans to further its cyber-capabilities. According 
to Joe McReynolds at the Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis, the 
newest issue of The Science of Military Strategy is confirmation of these cyber-
capabilities. Because it is disseminated by the PLA itself, the publication is 
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meticulously studied by many western experts.152 It provides the leading 
examination of the function of the Chinese government in cyber-crime, as well as 
the Communist party’s position on hacking. The Science of Military Strategy is 
produced “once in a generation,” McReynolds said, and “is the first time we’ve 
seen an explicit acknowledgement of the existence of China’s secretive cyber-
warfare forces from the Chinese side”.153  
   There is a fundamental cultural difference that might significantly 
contribute to both the direct and indirect relationship between the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) and Chinese hackers. According to the interview 
performed with the member of Anonymous Serbia, he believes that foreign policy 
and hacking can be related. According to him, “countries like China don't have to 
be worried about answering to their own public, so they tend to lead, on the 
surface, at least, more offensive foreign policy. Nowadays, hacking is part of that 
foreign policy.”154 Normally, Western nations do not require its non-governmental 
citizens to attempt to collect information of any kind on the government’s behalf 
while in peacetime. Most other nations do not seem to participate in the types of 
actions that Chinese hackers are involved in. These activities, according to some 
observers, move far past intelligence-gathering, and into a much more malicious 
territory. The CCP does not make a differentiation between these two 
responsibilities, because its citizens are supposed to openly participate in actions 
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that further the growth of the nation. McReynolds wrote that the publication has a 
tendency to “focus heavily on the central role of peacetime ‘network 
reconnaissance’ — that is, the technical penetration and monitoring of an 
adversary’s networks — in developing the PLA’s ability to engage in wartime 
network operations.”155 According to McReynolds, the People’s Liberation Army 
does not see the same types of distinctions as its Western counterparts in 
military and civilian roles, and their philosophy for future conflicts even muddles 
these views further:   
In the high-tech local war which we will face in the future, the role of the 
masses as the main body of the war is embodied by the country. The 
great power of the people’s war is released through comprehensive 
national power, the combination of peace time and war time, the 
combinations of the military and the civilian, and the combination of war 
actions and non-war actions. Besides the direct participation and 
cooperation with the army’s operations in the region where war happens, 
the masses will support the war mainly by political, economic, technical, 
cultural and moral means.156  
 There is another arena where the Chinese system differs from Western 
practices and that is corporate espionage. Much like the PLA’s ideologies in 
intelligence gathering, gathering trade secrets falls under the same umbrella of 
intelligence gathering for the sake of national-growth. Due to its nominally 
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communist nature, the PRC does not make the distinguishment from the nation’s 
domestic production, and all of the country’s possessions and resources are 
regarded as property of the Chinese people. Money, banking, and other financial 
organization usually comprise one of the pillars of society and are vital for the 
maintaining stability. This ranks even higher than that of the development of 
military capabilities, as a weak financial base makes military growth futile. For a 
growing society like the PRC, which seeks to enhance its military might, the PRC 
must first develop a strong financial base. So with this in mind, hacking attempts 
that support the promotion of government initiatives, whether state-sponsored or 
independent, would be seen as beneficial and more likely to be allowed to 
continue by officials. In a 2002 official warning from Taiwanese police for 
example, it stated that “some 300,000-plus hackers in China who break into high-
tech companies around the world and steal confidential information and 
programs, with the tacit consent of the Chinese government.”157 Also evaluating 
this topic, iSight Chief Executive, John Watters has said “Nothing suggests that 
Chinese authorities are vigilantly prosecuting those who are attacking foreign 
interests. They turn a blind eye to it as long as it doesn’t oppose national 
interests.”158 One reason for these types of actions by the government revolves 
around the country’s increasing energy requirements, as the Chinese 
government finds itself under greater pressures to sustain its economic 
momentum as it moves into the future, they must acquire stability in their energy 
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resources. Chinese hackers, whether working for personal gain or as state 
operatives, are finding that the exchange of information associated with the 
petroleum and energy industries are extremely profitable and/or extremely 
important to the growth of the Chinese state. So out of either a nationalistic 
viewpoint or financial gain, Chinese hackers are finding that the government is 
more apt to turn a blind eye to these types of practices or even facilitating the 
hacks themselves. 
   These types of attacks span more than a decade and are not only easily 
recognized but can also be readily researched. Much like many media outlets, 
researchers find the prospect of state-sponsored hacker groups very interesting. 
In 2004, Shawn Carpenter, an expert at Sandia National Laboratories managed 
to uncover a sizable cyber-espionage organization with links to known state-
sponsored hackers in China’s Guangdong Province. These hackers were given 
the alias “Titan Rain” by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Like stated before, 
the attackers behind Titan Rain assaulted hundreds of systems in a single night. 
 
PLA Unit 61398: Advanced Persistent Threat 1 
A recent publication issued by the American cyber-security firm Mandiant 
exposes a group based out of Shanghai and the shocking history of hacking and 
cyber-theft linked to it. Mandiant argues that this group of hackers is Chinese 
military-based, with specific connections to the PLA. Since 2004, Mandiant 
(which has since been purchased by FireEye) has researched cyber-security 
penetrations at organizations globally. They dub this individual group APT1, and 
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proclaim that it is one of more than 20 “advanced persistent threat” or APT 
groups that originate from China. The firm witnessed the Chinese group break 
into over a hundred computer systems belonging to Western government 
institutions and corporations. According to the publication, “though our visibility of 
APT1’s activities is incomplete, we have analyzed the group’s intrusions against 
nearly 150 victims over seven years.”159 This group is believed to be the Second 
Bureau of the PLA’s General Staff Department’s Third Department, which is 
usually recognized by the military label “Unit 61398.”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Unit 61398 Activity. The first shows the activity of the PLA group that 
is accused of attacking American systems. 
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Figure 15: Cyber-Attacks Performed by APT1.160  
 
 Throughout Mandiant’s investigation, APT1 besieged almost two dozen 
industries, paying special consideration to areas that could be deemed as crucial 
to the Chinese government and state, like technology and military for example. 
The evidence that Mandiant has compiled linking this hacker group to the 
Chinese military is extraordinary. The key is in the location of Unit 61398’s 
headquarters. Military Unit 61398 is located in the Shanghai’s Pudong New Area, 
and their station itself is a facility twelve floors high built in 2007. The group’s 
undertakings have been traced by the security organization to Shanghai 
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networks, with two of the four found being located in the same area as Unit 
61398 base of operations. Ninety-eight percent of the IP (Internet Protocol) 
addresses used by APT1 were traced back to China, and 99.8 percent of the 
HTRAN communication IP addresses were registered to the Shanghai 
networks.161 IP addresses are used to identify a device while on a network like 
the internet. Through the use of IP addresses, three individual hackers 
(“UglyGorilla,” “DOTA,” and “SuperHard”) were traced both to APT1 and the 
Pudong area, each with very detailed links.162 HTRAN communication IP 
addresses are proxy server addresses used to mask a host’s address. Even after 
the report’s publication, the Chinese government denied any wrongdoing. In 
response, a government webpage asserted that many of these attacks were 
performed using commandeered IP addresses and that IP addresses are very 
misleading.163 
  In 2013, The U.S. Department of Defense openly accused Chinese state-
sponsored hacking groups of attacking and extracting information from United 
States civilians, government, military, and businesses. The founder of security 
firm Ivincea, Anup Ghosh, added “the acknowledgement by the Pentagon is a 
first step in publicly declaring the threat.” This comes more than a year after the 
United States Justice Department officially indicted five military officials from 
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China for breaking into the systems of American corporations and pilfering 
exclusive records and documents. American prosecutors revealed that the group 
had stolen trade secrets from five businesses as well as a labor union. “The 
alleged hacking appears to have been conducted for no reason other than to 
advantage state-owned companies and other interests in China, at the expense 
of businesses here in the United States,” attorney general Eric Holder said in a 
dramatic press conference that included posters of the five individuals.164 In 
response, Qin Gang of the foreign ministry replied that the accusations were 
“made up” and could very much “damage Sino-American co-operation and 
mutual trust” if the charges stood. He would go on to state that “China is a 
staunch defender of network security, and the Chinese government, military and 
associated personnel have never engaged in online theft of trade secrets.”165 The 
alleged conspirators were all known members of the PLA’s Unit 61398. Speaking 
on behalf of the PRC, Qin Gang of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs proclaimed the 
the arrests are “based on fabricated facts,” and that “China is steadfast in 
upholding cyber security. The Chinese government, the Chinese military and 
their relevant personnel have never engaged or participated in cyber theft or 
trade secrets.”166  
  While if the previously mentioned PLA unit indeed is in operation, it 
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performs its tasks in the shadows, that does not mean that there are no other 
cyber divisions within the PLA or the government. Quite the contrary, in February 
2014, President Xi Jingpin announced the establishment of a group named the 
Central Internet Security and Informatization Leading Group.167 The group exists 
as an information security organization, and is led prominent individuals like Lu 
Wei (who also heads the Party’s Cyberspace Administration).168 Both the military 
unit within the PLA and the group led by Lu Wei show that both the Party and the 
military are very concerned about the country’s cyber-capabilities, and are 
beginning to move within sight of the international community. 
 
Operation Shady Rat (2006-2010) 
In 2005 and 2006 a group attacked a total of seventy-two organizations, 
corporations, and governments, as well as the International Olympic Committee. 
Over fourteen different countries were victims, and it was one of the largest 
hacking operations ever at that time. Having been blamed for attacks on the IMF 
and Sony, the media and many experts pointed the finger at the Chinese 
government. Dmitri Aplerovich, vice president of McAfee securities said that “This 
is the biggest transfer of wealth in terms of intellectual property in history. The 
scale at which this is occurring is really, really frightening, we were surprised by 
the enormous diversity of the victim organizations and were taken aback by the 
audacity of the perpetrators.” The operation gained its name from the tools used 
in the attack: remote access tools (RAT).  
                                                          
167 Bandurski, David. "What's up with the PLA?" CMP Newswire. May 21, 2015. Accessed May 
01, 2016. http://cmp.hku.hk/2015/05/21/38822/.  
168 Ibid 
 114 
 
Recognized as one of the biggest chains of cyber-attacks since the rise of 
hackers, McAfee securities unraveled in 2014 what they dubbed “Operation 
Shady Rat.” Using common spear-phishing tactics, systems that are attacked are 
bombarded with personal communications (usually emails) that are sent to 
people within. Once the file is opened malware is downloaded onto the victims 
computer and the file is opened. Once opened a program will initiate and exploit 
whatever the hackers are trying to do. The targets are found in many locations 
globally. McAfee revealed that the systems are penetrated using “obfuscated or 
encrypted HTML comments embedded in otherwise benign websites, in order to 
indirectly control compromised endpoints,” FireEye securities added that this type 
of method is linked to a collection identified as “Comment Group”, who is 
assumed to be connected to either the PRC or the PLA.169 
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Figure 16: Shady Rat Phishing Attack.170  
 
Operation Aurora (2009-2010) 
  Discovered in late 2009, this operation was a high-profile attack against 
Google and linked directly by security expert Brian Krebs to the Chinese 
government.171 Operation Aurora takes its name due to the fact that attackers 
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utilized the Aurora Trojan horse program. Attackers used a database of Gmail 
accounts accumulated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and law 
enforcement agencies. “In mid-December [2009], we detected a highly 
sophisticated and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure originating from 
China that resulted in the theft of intellectual property from Google,” said an 
online message by Google’s chief legal officer, David Drummond. Nevertheless, 
Google stated that the incident affected “at least twenty other large companies 
from a wide range of businesses – including the Internet, finance, technology, 
media and chemical sectors – have been similarly targeted.”172 Chinese IP 
addresses were uncovered as the main servers in the attacks as the source 
servers in the attacks, and Symantec securities linked the Chinese hacker group 
Hidden Lynx to the attacks. Another reason the attacks are believed to be 
Chinese in origin is because much of the programing in the attacks is written 
using Chinese tools and with Chinese code.173 Because the region of origin for 
the attacks was traced back to Chinese servers and the code itself was created 
using distinct Chinese computer code, it is not uncalled for for these security 
experts to blame Chinese individuals or groups for these attacks. 
  Experts believe that the attacks from Aurora originated from Shanghai 
Jiaotong University and the Lanxiang Vocational School in the Shandong 
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province.174 On the other hand, Chinese authorities both within the government 
as well as with the universities have denied any wrongdoing. Li Zixiang with the 
Lanxiang school even formally stated that “investigations …found no trace the 
attacks originated from our school.”175  Rong Lanxiang, the founder of the 
Lanxiang School made a public statement in which he said “The report (by The 
New York Times) is merely a fabrication. We do have students joining the PLA, 
but it is part of the national policy of military recruitment. Our computing center 
has more than 2000 computers, but this fact has nothing to do with Baidu. [The 
report] said we have a military background, this is a joke.”176 
 
Deep Panda (2011-2015) 
  Between 2011 and 2015, a group that went by many different names 
attacked various high profile organizations in one of the greatest acts of cyber-
espionage ever. Also known as Shell Crew,” the group has been linked to attacks 
on the health care providers Anthem, and Premera, in addition to the U.S. Office 
of Personnel Management. The penetration of data on the health care providers 
resulted in the theft of the financial and medical records of approximately eleven 
million individuals. The group’s activities were first seen in 2011 with smaller 
attacks on the American and Japanese organizations related to infrastructure. It 
was named “Deep Panda” due to its links to China. 
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Figure 17: A FBI Alert for Deep Panda. A email alert sent to all members of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation about the security issues brought forth by the 
Deep Panda attacks.177 
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Figure 18: Logo and Calling Card for Deep Panda. The logo for Deep Panda as it 
left on sites as a calling card on websites after an attack.178 
 
Operation Poisoned Hurricane (2014) 
  First discovered in early 2014, this group targeted several internet service 
providers, government organizations, an American media company, and a 
financial institution. The hackers used malware that was connected to websites 
like adobe.com and outlook.com, but individuals were re-routed to pages that 
hackers had set up to look legitimate. Security firm FireEye identified twenty-one 
websites that were hijacked this way. 
  All twenty-one websites were configured using the same internet service, 
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Hurricane Electric’s public DNS (domain name service) service, meaning that all 
twenty-one sites were run by the same organization. FireEye believes that the 
targets were involved in the Hong Kong democracy protests. The People’s 
Republic of China is the being in all likelihood to be concerned with attaining this 
goal.179 The attack was given its name because the system attacked belonged to 
a corporation called Hurricane Electric. The cyber-security firm FireEye tracked 
the operation and published their findings. In their conclusions they state that 
they observed “the use of Hurricane Electrics public DNS resolvers to redirect 
command and control traffic.” They also state that “the fact that the malware 
appears to beacon to legitimate domains may lull defenders into a false sense of 
security.”180 
 
Emissary Panda (2015-Present) 
  In 2015, the Emissary Panda group targeted a wide range of organizations 
involved in defense manufacturing and international relations. Also known as TG-
3390, the websites compromised by the group were connected with five diverse 
establishments, which industrial firms, predominantly those providing to the 
sector of defense; U.S. embassies involved in international relations; government 
organizations; energy enterprises; and several non-government organizations 
(NGOs). Based on this information, researchers with Dell SecureWorks Counter 
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Threat Unit believe that the group’s objective was to gather information pertaining 
to defense, manufacturing data and blueprints, and vital information found in 
government and NGO systems.181 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Emissary Panda Attacks 2015. Amount of attacks per week by the 
Emissary Panda group between July 13 and August 10, 2015.182 
 
Wekby (2015) 
  Also known as APT 18, Dynamite Panda, and TG-0416, this group stole 
four and a half million patient records from Community Health Systems in 2015. 
Using a method that is shown to be very familiar to Chinese hackers, spear-
phishing emails were sent that were titled “Important: Flash Update” to company 
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personnel. The hackers used a zero-day attack using Adobe Flash Player code. 
The emails contained a link that led the readers to an apparently official 
download page. Those who clicked on the link downloaded a malicious file 
containing malware. “This group typically targets companies in the aerospace 
and defense, construction and engineering, technology, financial services, and 
healthcare industry verticals,” said Charles Carmakal, managing director at 
Mandiant securities “The attacker has been known to steal intellectual property 
related to medical technology and pharmaceutical manufacturing processes.”183 
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Figure 20: Wekby Phishing Attack184 
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CHAPTER SIX:  
FREELANCE ACTORS, THE GREY AREA 
As with everything in this world, hackers in China do not exist in a world of 
simple black and white. There are grey areas between that cannot be defined in 
such polarized categories. In the world of Chinese hacking, there are groups and 
individuals that move between the lines separating independent actors and state-
sponsored agents. These individuals are best described as freelance actors. 
They are those who render their services to the highest bidder, even if that bidder 
is the Chinese government. There are groups that at one moment carry out 
attacks that are significantly linked to the Chinese government, and then 
performing attacks with no link at all to the government. Due to the fluid 
allegiances of these groups, it is sometimes difficult to unravel the motivations for 
their attacks. 
   Wan Tao, one of China’s first nationalistic hackers believes that there is 
another separate group of hackers that he labeled “underground hackers.” They 
are best described as black-market operatives who peddle their unique abilities 
or act on their own volition in order to increase their reputation in hopes of 
expanding their business opportunities. “Their business model is to sell,”185 Wan 
declares. He provides his own experiences as a prominent hacker as proof. As a 
member of the prominent hacking group, the “Green Army,” he e-mail bombed 
the Japanese prime minister in 1997 and conducted many attacks on U.S. 
webpages after the 2001 EP-3 incident. He acted on his own initiative and not as 
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an agent of the Communist party. Yet, as his reputation grew he was solicited to 
offer his skills. 
  While attending a security conference in Guangzhou in 1998, Wan was 
approached by law enforcement seeking his assistance. He designed a software 
system in order for law enforcement to ascertain the authors of anonymous 
postings on webpage bulletin boards.  “I’m a security expert,” he explains. “They 
had the need.” He was later approached by the PLA for assistance, but he 
declined to help. He did instead help recruit other hackers into their services. 
When anti-Japanese riots shook China in 2005, the Communist Party worked to 
mute the same nationalistic attitude it had nurtured for so many years. Wan Tao 
was at one time free to attack non-nationals online, and then he was commanded 
by the powers that be to remove seditious substance from his personal website. 
“I thought I had freedom online,” says Wan. “But I was wrong.”186  
  Wan’s story did in fact come full circle. In 2011 and 2012, cyber-crime 
skyrocketed in China.  According to official statistics, approximately 260 million 
Chinese were victims of cyber-attacks during this time.187 Those who were once 
motivated by nationalistic and patriotic causes where lured into illegality by 
financial motivations. In response, Chinese authorities fought back against cyber-
crime within their borders. The man who was once approached by the PLA for 
assistance was jailed. No longer in jail and working as a cybersecurity consultant, 
he stresses that at no time provided he provide hacking services to the Chinese 
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government.  
 Wan Tao’s story is the perfect example of the fluidity of hacking culture in 
China. At any point, many Chinese hackers could be classified under any of the 
three categorizations (independent, state-sponsored, freelance). Much like every 
other job, hacking can be all about profit. This is not always the case, but it is a 
strong motivation nonetheless. During a speech, the Guangdong Province 
governor Lu Ruihua, stated “as long as they [Chinese hackers] do not break the 
law, there is no loss, regarding the master hacker; we can send them a thousand 
dollars a month to support them! Some sectors of the system are not easy to find 
vulnerabilities; why cannot I use the hacker’s knowledge and skills.”188 It is under 
these circumstances where normally independent actors can become agents of 
the state, either on a short-term or long-term basis.  
 Much like that of an independent actor, nationalism can be a large 
motivation for why Chinese hackers blur the line between independent and state-
sponsored. Over the past few generations, China has been battling to regain its 
power on the global stage. When examining freelance Chinese hackers, it is 
important to know that Chinese nationalism, in the view of many, is especially 
concerned with returning the nation to its previous glory. It is not entirely about 
conflict with the west or the US, though this is a part of that impetus. As stated 
before, the majority of Chinese hackers are young (many are of college age) and 
can be fanatical about topics that affect their nation’s global image and standing. 
From the earliest days of the Chinese hacking scene, many attacks emanating 
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from China have been politically fueled and are commonly a means to protest 
against actions or perceived stances of foreign countries. However, as significant 
as nationalistic motivations are, monetary motivations seem to be becoming 
almost as important. Many companies and organizations are taking advantage of 
this, including the Chinese government. There are a significant number of 
patriotic hackers that steal commercial secrets with the intention of selling them 
to the highest bidder, which in some cases could be the government. 
 
Yujun Yumin 
 Recently, as a segment of its effort to improve and develop the PLA, the 
government has wanted to extract its assets located in the citizen populace. In 
2003, the PLA declared the program of yujun yumin, or in discovering military 
aptitude within its population.189 Consequently, ascertaining where the 
government concludes and the public commences is becoming a progressively 
difficult task, as has been an ongoing challenge throughout this study. Exploiting 
enemy weakness to overcome relative deficits in strength has been central to 
Chinese military planning as far back as the early Han dynasty, and was central 
to Mao Zedong’s theory of guerrilla warfare. Unrestricted Warfare, a book 
published in 1999 by the People’s Liberation Army, applies this longstanding 
approach to modern informational and cyber warfare, suggesting that the blurred 
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lines examined throughout this paper are there by design.190 
  Sometimes the Chinese government calls upon its people to act for the 
government. Other times hackers aid in fulfilling or completing the government’s 
agenda purely by following their own nationalistic ideals. A member of the 
Chinese hacking group “Honker Union,” codenamed “Prince,” also provides a 
good example of this and the experiences of a freelance hacker. “Prince” has 
gone on record saying that the group’s actions, as well as the individuals 
themselves, are strictly based on nationalistic agendas. “We never proactively 
launch attacks for no reason. We only do it when China’s national interest is 
harmed,” he said. “In most of the cases, we just fight back.”191  
  He says the hackers act on their own but that occasionally they are called 
on by the government to help track those believed to be working against the 
state. “I independently have some cooperation with the Chinese government but 
it’s all off the record,” he said. “The government normally asks me to follow the 
electronic footprint of different hackers, gather information on hackers, and 
ultimately submit official reports.”192 
  We should note that this kind of activity is certainly not restricted to China. 
There are examples of this within the United States. In 1997, the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation sought to test how vulnerable America’s networks were by hiring 
outside hackers to attack their own systems. They employed “a team of eccentric 
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computer geniuses who occasionally helped out with law enforcement 
investigations and who called themselves ‘The L0pht.’”193 They could break 
passwords stored in any operating system. They could decrypt any satellite 
communications. They even created software that could hack into someone’s 
computer and control it remotely, spying on the user’s every keystroke, changing 
the user’s files, kick the user off the internet, or send the user to any site of their 
choosing.194 The group was even brought to Capitol Hill on May 19, 1998 to 
testify about the status of the internet. This group operated in whatever capacity 
suited them best, and in this case just so happened to work in concert with a 
government agency to do what they did best, and that was hack. 
 
GhostNet (2006–2009) 
GhostNet was a cyber-espionage operation that penetrated computers 
and stole records from many international governments and public organizations. 
The system used by the attackers corrupted systems with a Trojan horse 
branded “gh0st RAT”, which granted them comprehensive, instantaneous 
command of the system. The gh0st RAT malware has been linked to China’s 
Hainan Province. Ultimately, there existed a network of approximately 1,300 
contaminated systems in over 100 nations. In addition, approximately 30 percent 
of these systems were deemed as highly importance victims . These systems 
encompassed several departments of international affairs, international 
businesses, embassies, and media outlets. Christened GhostNet, this cluster of 
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systems was centered on Asian governments. 
  Gh0st RAT was capable of seizing complete influence of contaminated 
systems, and was able to explore and take particular documents, as well as 
secretly controlling devices like cameras. When asked about the government of 
China’s involvement, Wenqi Gao a spokeman for the Chinese Consulate in New 
York rejected the notion that it was implicated. “These are old stories and they 
are nonsense,” Gao said. “The Chinese government is opposed to and strictly 
forbids any cybercrime.”195  
 
Hidden Lynx (2009–2012?) 
In February 2013, a security company named Bit9 which is now known as 
Carbon Black Inc, issued a proclamation divulging that a recognized collection 
titled “Hidden Lynx” was able to breach the company’s system. The group is an 
expert group of assailants with sophisticated skills. The group has existed ever 
since 2009, and is almost certainly a group that its skills in exchange for financial 
gain. Many of the attacks linked to this group involve the retrieval of information, 
and the targets are a significant arrangement of businesses and governments. 
The collection utilizes innovative methods, separating them from other hacking 
organizations. According to security firm Symantec, Hidden Lynx is a good-sized 
group consisting of between at most 100 people. 
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Black Vine (2012–2014) 
In early 2014, the biggest healthcare data breach ever occurred on one of 
the largest health insurers in the United States, Anthem. The Anthem breach 
began in May 2014 when the company was contaminated with a malicious 
program called Mivast. The breach was not discovered until February of 2015, 
almost a year after it had commenced. The invaders stole the records and 
confidential information of millions of individuals. Symantec’s report on Operation 
Aurora also offered evidence linking the same group to a China-based IT security 
company known as Topsec, which also happens to be funded by the 
government. 196   
  Like I stated earlier, the world of Chinese hacking does not exist purely in 
blacks and whites. There are groups like Hidden Lynx and individuals like Wan 
Tao that move between the classifications of independent and state-sponsored 
agents. They are those who are likely to be motivated by financial means and are 
the most likely to sell their services to the highest bidder. Wan Tao, for example, 
has gone on record stating that independently he has helped the government 
track individuals and do other services. Black Vine, on the other hand, has been 
directly linked to the organization TopSec, which is a state-run group. These 
hackers are the ones that make it most difficult to make classifications of the 
Chinese hacking culture.
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CHAPTER SEVEN:  
CYBER-CRIME AND THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY 
The topic of cyber-crime is extraordinarily important in a world where 
online activities encompass the most essential facets of our lives. U.S. officials 
even alerted President Barack Obama that China had hacked into his campaign 
computer systems, gaining access to position papers, finances, and emails. 
Obama had decided later to confront the Chinese directly on their rampant 
penetrations of U.S. computer networks. On March 11, 2013, President Obama’s 
National Security Consultant Thomas Donilon, presented at the New York Asia 
Society. At the event he said that American corporations were more and more 
apprehensive “about sophisticated, targeted theft of confidential business 
information and proprietary technologies through cyber intrusions emanating 
from China on an unprecedented scale.”197 
  The subject of Chinese cyber-attacks is a moderately new field owing to 
the modern expansion of the phenomenon. However, international concerns 
about hacking as a whole are not. In 1990, the United Nations General Assembly 
approved computer crime laws. Key nations began forming approaches and 
doctrines to battle online crime and defend information as early as 1997. At the 
turn of the century, regulations and procedures were established internationally 
throughout the global community. Countless countries have created legislation 
with defense and prosecution of cybercrimes in mind. Many researchers and 
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academics had become attracted to the fields of cybercrime, the internet, and 
cyberespionage as information was easily accessible. 
 
A Borderless Crime 
Many computer crimes are transnational, meaning that they cross borders 
and jurisdictions. A cybercrime can be committed in one country with a victim in 
another country, thousands of miles away. Because every nation is connected to 
the Internet, cybercriminals can commit offenses from anywhere, and victims can 
be anywhere. Moreover, offenders can be very mobile, moving from one place to 
the next very quickly if needed. Hackers can physically operate in one country, 
easily access data on computers located in a different continent, and then move 
to another location to evade law enforcement. The borderless nature of 
cybercrime also means that any nation can be targeted and its citizens victimized 
from anywhere in the world. This makes it very difficult, if not impossible, for law 
enforcement to determine the country in which the crime was actually committed 
and then to locate the specific offender. If an offender is found, it may be unclear 
what agency should have jurisdiction to adjudicate the offense. To fix this issue, 
the United Nations has developed legislature to combat cybercrime. In 2000, the 
organization passed Resolution 55/64, which includes: 
(a) States should ensure that their laws and practice eliminate safe 
havens for those who criminally misuse information technologies. 
(d) Legal systems should protect the confidentiality, integrity, and 
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availability of data and computer systems from unauthorized impairment 
and ensure that criminal abuse is penalized.198 
 In order for transnational crimes to be prosecuted, there has to be two 
kinds of jurisdiction: substantive and investigative. Both of these are required for 
cases of transnational cyber-crimes. States must be able to uphold that their 
systems of criminal law utilized be applied to the case in question. It is important 
that a nation’s laws can be applied to cases that take place partly within its 
territories, or even outside their territory. In the case of cybercrime and internet 
crimes, this can be tricky because these forms are global in scope. Additionally, it 
needs to be seen if these nations have the legal ability to carry out investigative 
actions that concern the territories of other states. In many of these cases, 
international cooperation is required. In order to provide for cases such as cyber-
crime, multilateral and bilateral levels of international treaty laws are created, as 
well as national laws that form the basis for an individual nation’s cooperation. 
 
Creation of International Laws 
As a result of the mounting danger of worldwide cybercrime and the 
political and legal complications in organizing law enforcement that can traverse 
international lines, numerous endeavors have been created to enable and assist 
collaboration amongst nations. One of the earliest and more important attempts 
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the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime.199 The treaty has remained 
an issue of considerable deliberation by the European Union since as early as 
1997. The objective of the convention was seen as an effort to “harmonize laws 
against malicious hacking, virus writing, fraud and child pornography on the net. 
It also aims to ensure that police forces in separate countries gather the same 
standard of evidence to help track and catch criminals across borders.”200 Since 
cybercrime often has a tendency to transcend an individual nation’s borders, the 
measures to combat it must also of course be of an international nature. 
 The treaty’s contents are a great example of international legislation that 
pertains to computer-based crimes. Articles 2 through 11 of the Treaty 
accomplish the goal of prohibiting specific types of conduct.201 Each nation that 
endorses the treaty is expected to agree upon specified criminal offenses and the 
associated consequences for crimes perpetrated within that nation, the territories 
in their possession, on a state’s vessel or aircraft, or by their citizens when they 
are in a foreign country. The offenses are categorized in four areas of crime: 
scam and counterfeiting, child pornography, intellectual property, and computer 
system intrusion or hacking. Other articles in the treaty establish a legal 
procedure for each state, incorporating human rights protections, legal 
processes, and the apparatuses and actions for criminal investigations.202 
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 Most major countries have created national legislation related to 
cybercrime extradition and have provided for legal assistance concerning other 
nations in cases where these nations call for assistance in matters that extend 
across borders. Almost all countries in Europe have reported that such legislation 
exists within their countries. The United Kingdom was the first country to create 
national legislation in the subject of cybercrime. The legislation in question was 
“The Computer Misuse Act of 1990,” which contained punishments for computer-
related crimes.203 Many nations soon followed suit. China promulgated the 
“Computer Information Network and Internet Security Protection and 
Management Regulations, 1997” to police internet activities. However, the 
Chinese legislation dealt mainly with national security within China instead of the 
deterrence of cybercrime. Chinese President Xi Jingping connected 
cybersecurity with national security as well as with the country’s growth, 
remarking that “there is no national security without cybersecurity, and no 
modernization without informatization.”204 In China, internet security has been a 
focal point of public opinion and government policy. In a survey conducted by the 
Chinese publication Global Times, 98.1 percent of individuals support the 
government’s initiative of creating specialized laws to protect internet security.205 
To this day, the U.S. has the widest range of legal conditions regarding 
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cybercrime, incorporating provisions concerning violations, investigation, as well 
as punishment.  
 There are also international coalitions and groups that have legislation 
pertaining to the subject. The European Commission, the executive board that 
administers the European Union, announced in 1995 a data protection 
directive.206 It concentrated on the online security of personal data. The directive 
was amended again in 2011 to combat new technology and circumstances. 
NATO, the North America Treaty Organization, created cyber-defense 
responsibilities for its controlled websites by establishing the NATO Computer 
Incident Response Capability (NCIRC).  
 Along the same lines, the Council of Europe implemented significant 
proposals to its member states regarding criminal procedural law on cybercrime 
in 1995. The group’s recommendations formed the basis of the Convention on 
Cybercrime on 2001. The international treaty contained policies to ease the 
gathering of evidence, as well as the prosecution and punishment of criminals, 
for the nations involved. By agreeing to the treaty, the country agreed to create a 
minimum set of national laws to mirror the treaty’s laws on particular computer-
based crimes.  
  More modernly, because of the hacking efforts of the US actors on China 
and the efforts of Chinese hackers on US systems, the United States and 
Chinese governments have made some serious breakthroughs in international 
cooperation to combat cybercrime. According to New York Times writer David E. 
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Sanger, “The United States and China are negotiating what could become the 
first arms control accord for cyberspace, embracing a commitment by each 
country that it will not be the first to use cyberweapons to cripple the other’s 
critical infrastructure during peacetime.” To counter Sanger’s statement about the 
international accord, People’s Daily writer Liu Xin proclaimed that the agreement 
“is expected to halt all disputes” and “could serve as a role model for other 
countries”.207 From both sides, there is definitely mutual cooperation. There are 
other countries with incredible cyber-capabilities like Russia that would be the 
next logical addition to any international accords, like for two nations with 
significant cyber-power to come together and form even a shaky alliance is a 
step in the right direction. 
  The cyberwarfare capabilities of the three nations is indeed moving into 
the forefront of the minds of everyday citizens, as well as in popular culture. The 
novel Ghost Fleet by Singer and Cole, portrays the increasing fears of cyber-
attacks and cyber warfare on a global scale. Chinese cyber warfare lays the 
groundwork for war in the narrative on the story. They prey on real fears of today 
in an attempt to predict tomorrow. For example, American equipment and 
systems manufactured in China are infiltrated without the knowledge of the 
American public. Hackers are active, public, and a military force in China as well, 
even well equipped with the fictitious tools needed to create an army of red 
hackers as the unthinking arm of the government. The authors romanticize the 
topic making it very popular, especially in the cyber-defense circles. It expresses 
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the anxiety of the American public, and what makes it even more significant is 
that it is not entirely wrong. 
  Some of the themes of the novel are very much a reality. In 2012 
Microsoft researchers found that computers that had never before turned on 
were already compromised by malware.208 In 2015, Lenovo, one of the world’s 
biggest computer manufacturers, was found selling systems with malware and 
other malicious software pre-installed. The software was named the “Superfish 
Malware”, and it was found with the ability to analyze the users internet usage in 
an attempt to interject advertisements into the computers web browser.209 
  Behind President Xi Jingping, China has indeed made progress in halting 
the efforts of hackers in the mainland. In 2014, the Cyberspace Administration of 
China (CAC) was founded. It is now the group responsible for the governance of 
the internet within the PRC. During the group’s first meeting, President Xi 
stressed that the lack of network security throughout the country is indeed 
negatively affecting the whole. According to Bill Hagestad, in his book Chinese 
Cyber Crime, the President called for “unified planning, unified deployment, 
unified effort, and unified implementation.”210 The President offered this, “in 
today’s world, the ever-changing information technology revolution of the 
international political, economic, cultural, social, military and other areas of 
development had a profound impact… China is in this tide, it affected more and 
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more… we must also realize that we are relatively backward in terms of 
innovation.”211 It are instances like this that makes Ghost Fleet such a strong 
portrayal. It takes subjects that strike fear in the present, and magnify them in the 
context of war. 
  The current landscape of cybercrime legislation involves ongoing legal 
reform, yet it is fairly new in terms of international law. States are increasingly 
aware that it requires legal responses across multiple platforms and across 
borders. These have a tendency to include criminal, civil, and administrative 
laws. Traditional laws can sometimes provide nations with the ability to prosecute 
cybercrime cases, but these cases usually have both the target and attacker 
within the country’s borders and do not require the aid of investigation of other 
nations. Although cybercrime law does date back several decades, it has only 
been in the past decade that cybercrime has become a significant global issue. 
In order to combat such a dynamic field and the ever-changing nature of 
computer-based concepts, the introduction of shared definitions and agreement 
on specific offenses have been created in an attempt to prosecute new crimes. 
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